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ABSTRACT

This article argues that Congress has the ability to force a President to
escalate military intervention when he is otherwise unwilling to do so. The article
begins by exploring the constitutional powers at Congress's disposal-the
Declare War Clause, the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the Commander-inChief Clause-and their historical application. It then establishes that, under
Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework, the Executive would be acting in
Category Three, meaning that the President may "rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter." Citing multiple Article I clauses, this article argues that Executive action
in contravention of Congressional efforts to increase military intervention would
unconstitutionally encroach on Congress's prerogative. Finally, it buttresses
these conclusions by drawing on historical precedent.
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[T]he powers properly belonging to one of the departments
ought not to be directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them
ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence
over the others, in the administration of their respective powers.
It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and
that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it.
-

I.

James Madison, The Federalist No. 48.
INTRODUCTION

When the Assad regime attacked Syrian civilians with chemical
weapons' within months of President Trump's inauguration, the Commander-inChief activated United States military might: at his command, the "military
launched 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian military airfield."2 The missiles "struck
an air base .. includ[ing] air defenses, aircraft, hangars and fuel." 3
The strike ran counter to President Trump's isolationist rhetoric and
purported policy viewpoint,4 which had "raised alarm in allied countries that still
rely on the [United States] for defense." 5 Yet the next day, U.N. Ambassador
Nikki Haley addressed the United Nations: "The United States took a very
measured step last night. We are prepared to do more, but we hope that will not
be necessary. '"6

I
See Anne Barnard & Michael R. Gordon, Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S.
2017),
4,
(Apr.
TIMES
N.Y.
Assad,
Blames
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/worldl/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html.
Dan Lamothe, Missy Ryan & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Strikes Syrian Military Airfield
2
in First Direct Assault on Bashar Al-Assad's Government, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-weighing-military-optionsfollowing-chemical-weapons-attack-in-syria/2017/04/06/0c59603a- 1ae8- 11 e7-9887Ia5314b56a08_story.html?utm term=.dOcf7d35d97c.
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Trump's Foreign-PolicyRevolution, NAT'L REv. (Jan. 27,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/44432 1/trump-foreign-policy8:00 PM),
2017,
isolationsim-america-first-allies-nato-trans-pacific-partnership.
5
Peter Graff, Trump's 'America First' Speech Alarms U.S. Allies, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2016,

6:14 A.M.), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-idUSKCNOXO1OR; see Zeke J.
Miller & Philip Elliott, U.S. Launches a Missile Attack at Syria in a Test of President Trump's
'America First' Policy, TIME (Apr. 6, 2017, 10:21 PM), http://time.com/4730107/syria-chemical-

donald-trump-assad/.
Harriet Alexander, Josie Ensor & Roland Oliphant, US Strikes on Syria: Xi Jinping Told
6
Donald Trump He Understood the US Response 'Because of the Death of Children', TELEGRAPH

(Apr.

7,

2017,

10:01

PM)

(emphasis

added)
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What if Congress did feel it necessary to "do more"? 7 What recourse
would legislators have?
Consider a hypothetical: a small-scale terrorist attack occurs on
American soil. Three Americans killed, sixteen maimed, and several hundred
others injured.8 The attacker avows loyalty to a new terrorist group. Imagine the
President disregards Congress's calls to strike back. 9 This would not be the first
time Congress was more hawkish than the President,1" though that has not been
the dynamic recently. 1 What tools in its arsenal can Congress deploy to escalate
the situation beyond what a dovish President executes?
Congress could appropriate money for such a strike and force the
President's hand. 2 Another potential lever is a declaration of war.13 If Congress
deploys these tools, when do the President's Commander-in-Chief powers14 and
separation-of-powers concerns come into play?
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-strikes-syria-tensions-rise-russia-warns-damageties-washington/.
7
Notably, in August 2016, most Americans favored airstrikes and special operations
campaigns into the Syrian civil war. See Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura & Kelhan Martin, Americans
Support Limited Military Action in Syria Against ISIS, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFF. (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/americans-support-limited-military-actionsyria-against-isis. Unheralded, these actions were already underway. See Adam Taylor, Poll:Most
Americans Support U.S. Military Action in Syria - But Only Want a LimitedAmount, WASH. POST
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/15/poll-mostamericans-support-u-s-military-action-in-syria-but-only-want-a-limitedamount/?utm term=.b9b7caee1336.
8
These are the exact statistics from the Boston Marathon Bombing. See Boston Marathon
Terror
Attack
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Mar.
25,
2018,
6:42
P.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/.
9
It is a hypothetical, after all.
10
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 85-86 (1991).
John Adams resisted calls for a declaration of war against France in 1798 and
instead sought authority for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James
Madison was ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; Grover
Cleveland in 1896 rebuffed the proposal by various members of Congress to
declare war on Spain; William McKinley in 1898 reluctantly conceded to the
same war fervor; and Woodrow Wilson successfully campaigned for
reelection in 1916 on the slogan, "He kept us out of war."
Id. (citations omitted).
II
See id at 85 ("Today, of course, we are so accustomed to thinking of Presidents as more
hawkish than Congress that the hypothetical of a dovish President would strike many as
preposterous.").
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
13
Id. § 8, cl. 11; see also Sidak, supra note 10, at 84-85 ("[T]he power to initiate
hostilities was clearly meant to be reserved to the Congress, with the President participating in that
initiative only so far as his signature was necessary to complete an act of Congress.") (quoting
Alexander M. Bickel et al., Indochina: The ConstitutionalCrisis, 116 CONG. REc. 15,410 (1970)).
14
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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This article explores the uneasy balance between the legislature's
authority to tax and spend as well as its ability to declare war, and the President's
Commander-in-Chief powers. The article begins by discussing each power in
turn, tracing their original understanding and subsequent interpretation. In
Section III, the article examines the messy intermingling of these powers. Section
IV then analyzes whether Congress's powers could indeed escalate a conflict and
concludes that Executive action in contravention of Congressional efforts to
increase military intervention would unconstitutionally encroach on Congress's
prerogative.
1I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RESPECTIVE POWERS AT PLAY

This section skims three of the most important categories of powers
written into our Constitution: the Spending Powers, Declare War Powers, and
Commander-in-Chief Powers. Within each, this article looks at both the text and
our Founding Fathers' original understanding of it, setting the stage to
demonstrate where these powers clash with one another.
A. Congress'sSpending Power
This section first presents the text of the Taxing and Spending Clause,
which states that Congress has the power to levy taxes for three purposes: to pay
debts, defend, and provide for the general welfare of the United States. Next, this
section analyzes the evolution of the interpretation of Congress's Spending
Power, from the Founding Fathers to a recent Supreme Court interpretation.
1. The Text
The Taxing and Spending Clause reads: "The Congress shall have
Power... [t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States[T.]" ' 5
As the Clause specifies, taxes can only be levied for three reasons:first,
to "pay the debts ...

of the United States."' 6 Paired with its sister clause-the

Borrowing Clause-this permits Congress to borrow against the nation's
credit.17 Second, "for the common Defense... of the United States." In the
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This is different from the Appropriations Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7. Together, the two are commonly referred to as the "power of the purse."
See Power of the Purse, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.,
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Power-of-the-Purse/
27,2018).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16
17

(last visited Aug.

Id. § 8, cl. 2; cf GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE

OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 21 (2d Sess. 2000).
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words of Justice Joseph Story, "[w]ithout such a power, it would not be possible
to provide for the support of the national forces by land or sea ....For these
'1 8
purposes at least, there must be a constant and regular supply of revenue."
Third, for the "general Welfare of the United States," or "the well-being
of the nation."" While exceptionally straightforward in theory, it is equally
amorphous and pliable in practice. One can only synthesize the outer bounds of
this concept by reviewing its understanding and interpretation since the
Constitution's ratification.
2.

The Taxing and Spending Clause as Understood at the Founding

Given the motto "no taxation without representation," 2 it is unsurprising
that the Framers modeled the spending powers on the British model: Parliament,
representing the people, barred the Crown from spending moneys beyond the
citizens' wishes.2 1 As, per Continental Congress Vice President Elbridge Gerry,
the House "was more immediately the representatives of the people,, 22 the
Continental Congress resolved to bestow "the power to originate money bills to
the House." 23
At the Founding, there were significant disputes as to the precise limits
of Congress's spending powers. In the words of Justice Owen Roberts:
Since the foundation of the Nation, sharp differences of opinion
have persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase.

As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One
method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible ...timely

disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater
disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only

by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace
to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not
ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to

bear.
Id.
18 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ed. 1891) [hereinafter STORY].
19

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §

932 (5th

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).

20
Interestingly, the phrase was born before the American Revolution: the slogan-cumphilosophy existed in Ireland for years before the colonists used it as a call to arms. See DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 61 (2001). This is highly surprising as the Crown's subjugation of
the Irish began far before that of the American colonists. Boston politician James Otis modified
the phrase but was no less evocative in telling would-be constituents "taxation without

representation is tyranny." DANIEL A. SMITH,
DEMOCRACY 23, 174 n.13 (1998).
21
See Power of the Purse, supra note 15.
22
Id.
23

TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT

Id.
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Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the
other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same
section; that, as the United States is a government of limited and
enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for the
general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated
legislative fields committed to the Congress. . . . Hamilton, on

the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate
and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in
meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general
welfare of the United States. Each contention has had the
support of those whose views are entitled to weight.24
Secondary sources confirm that Hamilton's interpretation won. In his
treatise on the Constitution, for example, Justice Story held that a tax levied
against and paid out to the general population passes constitutional muster.25
3. Subsequent Interpretation and Modern Understanding
However, the Clause's interpretation continued to ensnare the
Legislative and Executive Branches throughout the 19th century. On President
James Madison's last day in office, he vetoed John C. Calhoun's Bonus Bill of
1817, which sought to channel revenue from the Second Bank of the United
States to infrastructure improvements. 26 He did so because "[C]ongress had no
constitutional power to expend the public revenues for any such purpose. ' 27 His
successor, James Monroe, agreed.28 Such disputes were not uncommon before

Compare, e.g.,
24
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (1791), in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION: VOLUME
2 PREAMBLE THROUGH ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 1, 446, 446-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
http://pressat
available
eds.,
1987),
Lerner
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/aI 8 ls21.html, with, e.g., Letter from President James
Madison to the United States House of Representatives (March 3, 1817), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jm/18170303_veto.htm.
25
See STORY, supra note 18, at §§ 902-1049.
26

2

CYCLOP'EDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES § 196.6 (John J. Lalor, ed., N.Y., Maynard, Merrill, & Co. 1899)
[hereinafter CYCLOPIEDIA]; see also Stephen Minicucci, InternalImprovements and the Union,

AM. POL. DEV. 160, 164 (2004).
supra note 26, at § 196.6. In writing about the veto-or "negative"-to former
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, Thomas Jefferson opined that the interpretation of the Taxing
and Spending Clause "is almost the only landmark which now divides the federalists from the
republicans." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June16, 1817), in 10 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 91 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
28
CYCLOPfEDIA, supra note 26, at § 196.6.
1790-1860, 18
27

STUDIES

CYCLOPAEDIA,
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the Civil War. Moreover, endorsing these political measures was costly; John
Quincy Adams's signing of such bills contributed to Andrew Jackson's
subsequently landslide victory, as Jackson vociferously opposed-and
ultimately vetoed-them. 29
The Civil War changed this understanding. In that time, the Court
widened Congress's powers via its taxing power: in Chief Justice John Roberts's
words, the Court in that era proclaimed "It]he Federal Government may enact a
tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control."3
By the turn of the 20th century, the Court cracked down on pretextual
taxes empowering Congress with police powers.3 1 For example, in 1936, the
Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which, in effect, paid
farmers to limit their crop production so as to artificially drive price up by
reducing crop surpluses during the Great Depression.3 2 "[Tihe Court held that
[the law] could not be justified as an exercise of the taxing power because its
stated purpose was to regulate agricultural production, rather than raise revenue
for the United States. 33
In the Court's words:
[T]he act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory
plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter
beyond the powers delegated to the federal government. The tax,
the appropriation of the funds raised, and the direction for their
disbursement, are but parts of the plan. They are but means to
an unconstitutional end. 34
The Court in this era nevertheless adopted both an expansive and fluid
reading of a constitutional tax's minimal impact requirements. On the Clause's
expansiveness, the Court again looked to Justice Story's treatise to conclude that
constitutional "taxation and appropriation extend only to matters of national, as
distinguished from local, welfare," which were otherwise "the exclusive
province of the states. ' 35 And on its dynamism, the Court conceded that

29
John C. Eastman, Spending Clause, HERITAGE FOUND.: THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONST., http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/l/essays/34/spending-clause (last visited

Aug. 27, 2018).
30
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012) (citing License Tax Cases,

72 U.S. 462, 471 (1866)).
31
See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5
(1925); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
32
See generally United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
33 Lindsay F. Wiley, The U.S. Department of Agriculture as a Public Health Agency? A
"Healthin All Policies" Case Study, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 61, 76 n.94 (2013).
34 Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
35 Id. at 67, 69 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199 (1824)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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determining what constitutes "general" and "welfare" is akin to firing at moving
targets: "Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven
in our day with the well-being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes
with the times." 36
Throughout the 20th century, this broad interpretation remained
relatively unchallenged.
[C]ourts have essentially treated whatever limitation the clause
might impose as essentially a nonjusticiable political question
....Instead, the courts have focused... on whether various
conditions imposed on the receipt of federal funds-conditions
designed to achieve ends concededly not within Congress's
enumerated powers-were constitutionally permissible.37
Recently, this interpretation was challenged in National Federationof
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius.3 8 Channeling Shakespeare-"What's
in a name?" 3 9-- Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Affordable Care Act's
penalization of those without health insurance was identical to a tax and therefore
constitutionally permissible.4" Sebelius confirms that the Clause grants the
legislative body near-plenary power by which to achieve policy aims.
B. Congress'sPower to Declare War
"[O]ut of seventeen specific paragraphs of congressional power [in
article I, §8], eight of them are devoted in whole or in part to specification of
powers connected with warfare."41 Among the most powerful is the eleventh

36

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
Eastman, supra note 29; see also South Dakota v.

Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) ("The
level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned
whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.").
38 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
37

& JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 563-64 (reasoning that it is a tax because it "paid into the Treasury by
'taxpayer[s]' when they file their tax returns"; its application and amount are driven by a taxpayer's
federal tax; its "requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the
IRS"; and it sports "the essential feature of any tax: It produces at least some revenue for the
Government").
41
Proposed Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327,330 n.3 (1995)
39

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO

40

(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950)),
https://www.justice.gov/file/20146/download [hereinafter Proposed Deployment]. These include

the powers to: (1) "define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations"; (2) "declare war,
grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water"; (3)
"raise and support armies"; (4) "provide and maintain a navy"; (5) "make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces"; (6) "provide for calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions"; and (7) "provide for organizing,
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clause: "[t]o declare war."4 2 This section first examines the text of the Declare
War Clause. Next, it analyzes the historical context of "declaring war." Finally,
the section will examine the Supreme Court's modem reliance on the historical
meaning of declaring war.
1. The Text
Only two words encompass this mighty authority; "the Constitution
never defines 'declare war.' Hence, it will be impossible to establish, from an
examination of text alone, what 'declare war' means."43 But declaring is simply
"the act of making an official statement about something."' The question of how
is discussed infra.45
At the Founding, a "war" was the "fighting between two Kings, Princes
of parties, in vindication of their ju[s]t rights."46 Today's warfare has changed
enough to render this definition obsolete. The traditional notion of "declaring
armed hostile conflict between states or nations" or "a state of hostility, conflict,
or antagonism"4 7 remains, but today's wars are fought on myriad fronts-from
the seas to the skies, from the physical to the digital. Moreover, hostilities may
occur that are insufficient to merit the moniker "war."48
There are also questions regarding the declaration itself: What
constitutes a declaration? When must one declare war, and to whom? For
answers as well as a broader context, history may be instructive.

arming, and disciplining, the militia

..

and the authority of training the militia according to the

discipline prescribed by Congress." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

43
Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashingthe Dogs of War: What the ConstitutionMeans by "Declare
War", 93 CORNELL L. REv. 45, 54 (2007) [hereinafter Unleashingthe Dogs].
44
Declaration,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/declaration (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
45
See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
46

TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM,

2 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DCTIONARY, OR, GENERAL

ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (3d. ed., London 1783).
47
War, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war (last visited

Aug. 27, 2018).
48
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The 'CharmingBetsy' Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (examining how
international laws may clash with U.S. domestic laws to create conflicts not rising to the level of
war).
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2.

The Declare War Clause as Understood at the Founding

The origin of declaring war dates back millennia:
Indeed, from classical times, some nations had declared war via
heralds. The heralds would go to the enemy and, presumably
with a great deal of ceremony and perhaps with a trumpet,
announce the decision to wage war against that nation. Heralds
also might announce the war to the declarant's populace.4 9
Sweden's declaration of war against Denmark in 1657 marks the last time heralds
were declarants themselves.50
However, through the Founding, declarations were rarely made
formally. Instead, they could be implied from a sovereign's "actions that...
signaled unambiguous recourse to war."' 51 "As John Adams noted during the
Revolutionary War, neither England nor France needed to issue a formal
declaration of war against each other because war was 'sufficiently declared by
actual hostilities in most parts of the world."' 52
Knowing historical practices varied, the Framers sought to explicitly
demarcate the power to "declare war." Constitutional Convention delegates
debated the clause's original iteration: "to make war."'53 Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney first opposed it for pragmatic reasons: the legislature's "proceedings
were too slow."5 4
But a more substantive matter was afoot. James Madison and Elbridge
56
Gerry proposed to replace "make" with "declare. ' 55 George Mason agreed, as
did Oliver Ellsworth, because "there is a material difference between the cases
of making war, and making peace. It [should] be more easy to get out of war,

Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declarationof War, 77
L. REV. 89, 98 (2008) [hereinafter Moribund Declaration] (footnotes omitted); see
GEO.
also STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 26, 71-73 (2005).
49

WASH.

supra note 49, at 104-05.

50

See

51

Moribund Declaration,supra note 49, at 98.

NEFF,

Id. at 99 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (Feb. 14, 1779), in 3 THE
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 47, 48 (Francis Wharton
ed., Wash., Gov't Printing Office 1889)).
53
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 548 (E.H. Scott, ed., Chicago,
52

Albert, Scott & Co. 1894) [hereinafter RECORDS].
54
Id.
55

Id.

56

Id.
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than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended with
intricate [and] secret negotiations." 57 Ultimately, the motion passed.58
Despite the topic's importance, this constitutes the Constitutional
Convention's entire debate over the clause.5 9 Scholars have thus looked
elsewhere to understand the Clause's significance, as two streams of thought
have emerged: one suggesting its importance, and one minimizing it.
i.

Declaring War as a Sacred Obligation

There are some indications that a formal war declaration was required
for all military action. James Wilson, considered "[s]econd only to Madisonand an honorable second" 6 0 -"preferred a single magistrate [for an Executive],
as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office."6 1 But Wilson
did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a
proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these
prerogatives were of Legislative nature. Among others that of
war [and] peace[.] The only powers he conceived strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing
officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.62
This understanding speaks to the Framer's intended equipoise, which
ascribes substantial weight to the declaration itself. Wilson extolled the balance's
benefit: "This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against
it.", 63

Some of the strongest evidence of the clause's import can be found in
the actions and words of our first President. In the early 1790s, the Creek Indians
attacked newly minted Americans along the Cumberland River. South Carolina

57

Id.
Id. at 549. Notably, "only one delegate to either the Philadelphia Convention or any of the
state ratifying conventions, Pierce Butler, is recorded as suggesting that authority to decide on war
and peace be vested in the President ... and Butler subsequently disowned his earlier view." John
Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1379,
1386-87 (1988).
59
Charles A. Lofgrent, War-Making Under the Constitution: The OriginalUnderstanding,81
YALE L.J. 672, 675 (1972) (noting the discussion "occupies little more than one page out of the
1,273 which contain the printed records of the Convention").
60
CLINTON RossrrER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 247-48 (1966). Wilson was "one of
only six persons to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution" and one of the
debates' most frequent speakers. Kermit L. Hall, Introduction to COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, at xiiv (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, eds., 2007).
61
RECORDS, supra note 53, at 86.
62
Id.
63
Ely, supra note 58, at 1379 (1988) (citing 2 DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 528 (J. Elliot ed., 1866)).
58
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Governor William Moultrie subsequently asked Washington to send troops for a
counteroffensive. Washington responded that he could not do so until "whenever
Congress should decide that measure to be proper and necessary. The
Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no
offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall have
'
deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure." Washington
recognized a distinct limit on military campaigns--even defensive ones at that.65
The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 and the Pacificus-Helvidius
debates confirm this belief. Once the French declared war on Great Britain,
Washington called for an emergency cabinet meeting to consider declaring
neutrality; alternatively, Jefferson claimed the new government could "make
countries bid for neutrality. ' 66 While debates ensued as to whether the President
both sides recognized the
needed congressional approval to declare neutrality,
67
exclusive right of the legislature to "make" war.
ii.

DeclaringWar as a Formality

Two main arguments have been asserted to suggest that even at the
Founding, the power to declare war was at best proforma, diminishing its import
and Congress's foreign policy influence generally.
First, that replacing "make" to "declare" evinces a nuanced
understanding of what war is and how wars are fought, namely that a legislative
body is not itself involved in warfighting directly. Having made the distinction
between "make" versus "declare," one could infer the Framers understood the
substantial difference between declaring one's status of being at war and
executing it militarily and operationally.6 8 Because Congress could only declare

64

33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).

65

This is an especially important distinction because the clause was written to endow the

President with the "power to repel sudden attacks without a prior declaration of war." Sidak, supra
note 10, at 35. Additionally, this understanding has been refuted; several OLC opinions have
claimed Washington felt otherwise. See The President's Constitutional Auth. to Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 202 (2001)
[hereinafter Constitutional Authority], (citing David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 816 (1994),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2001/09/31 /op-olc-v025-p0 188_0.pdf
("[B]oth Secretary [of War] Knox and [President] Washington himself seemed to think this
[Commander-in-Chiefi authority extended to offensive operations undertaken in retaliation for
Indian atrocities."); Proposed Deployment, supra note 41, at 331 n.4. However, this quote is taken
out of context and, foregoing reference to the operations that led Currie to write this particular
phrase, doing a disservice to Currie's thesis.
RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 435 (2004). Lin-Manuel Miranda took some artistic
66
license on this issue.
67

See

generally

ALEXANDER

HAMILTON

&

JAMES

MADISON,

THE

PACIFICUS-

HELVIDIuS DEBATES OF 1793-1794 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
68
See Constitutional Authority, supra note 65, at 191-92.
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war, Congress could not dictate its execution. What's more, as the Office of
Legal Counsel phrased it, "[i]f the Framers had wanted to require congressional
consent before the initiation of military hostilities, they knew how to write such
provisions." 69 This is supported by Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, which utilizes
a similar distinction between a State's engaging in war and declaring it.7"
Second, historical practice suggests declarations' diminishing roles.
Records show that "undeclared war was the norm in eighteenth-century
European practice, a reality brought home to Americans when Britain's Seven
Years' War with France began on this continent."71 Empirical evidence bears
this out, too: "Of the eight major wars fought by Great Britain prior to the
ratification of the Constitution, war was declared only once before the start of
hostilities."72

Resultantly, many believe the Founders viewed formal declarations of
73

war as "obsolete.

3. Subsequent Interpretation and Modem Understanding
Given the short shrift the Founders paid the clause,
[i]t should be no surprise, therefore, that two centuries later the
debate over the original meaning of the War Clause provokes
disagreement among the most highly regarded of contemporary
interpreters of the Constitution, and that these scholars have
squeezed the last imaginable drop of interpretative significance
from the story of how... the Framers changed Congress's
power
' 74
to "wage War" to the power to "declare War[.]

Though important, these interpretations are not decisive in delineating
the power to declare war's implications. "Inruling on constitutional questions
involving foreign relations, the Supreme Court has often shown itself willing to
rely on the evolved practice and custom of the political branches."75 This

69

Id.at 192.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...engage
in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.").
71
W. TAYLOR REVELEY, III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE
70

ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 55 (1981); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton)
("the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse").
72
See Constitutional Authority, supra note 65, at 192 (citing John C. Yoo, The Continuation
of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167,

214-15 (1996)).
73

Id.

74 Sidak, supranote 10, at 35.
75
Proposed Deployment, supra note 41, at 331 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292-93 (1981)).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/7

14

Spivak: Co-Parenting War Powers: Congress's Authority to Escalate Conflic
CO-PARENTING WAR POWERS

2018]

includes how declarations have been interpreted. Though rare-our last war
declaration was 1941 76 -- an important lesson can still be learned from
declarations and the Supreme Court's interpretations thereof: whether offensive
or defensive, the nature of the attack matters.
Joseph Story, in his constitutional treatise, put forward the most
prominent view of the importance of declaring war only in offensive measures.
Because "formal declarations of war are in modern times often neglected, and
are never necessary," 77 declarations were only required when preempting
attacks.
The Supreme Court thereafter adopted this understanding. Leading up to
the Civil War, President Lincoln chose not to ask Congress to declare war on the
South because he felt that doing so necessarily recognized the South as a separate
sovereign. 8 Once the "Confederates bombarded Union soldiers at Fort Sumter,
South Carolina on April 12, 1861," the war began.7 9 Thereafter, Lincoln ordered
a naval blockade of Southern ports.8 ° When ships were taken in the blockade, the
Supreme Court adjudicated whether the blockade was constitutional because
Congress had not declared war on the Confederacy. In The Prize Cases,"l the
Court stated:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a
national or foreign war ....

[The President] is bound to take

care that the laws be faithfully executed[.] He has no power to
initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a
domestic State. [But if] a war be made by invasion of a foreign
is not only authorized but bound to resist
nation, the President
82
force by force.

Over a century later, the Court confirmed this view when ruling for
taxpayers who filed for an injunction against Department of Defense officials
from "participating in any way in military activities in or over Cambodia or

76

See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31133,

DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf.
77
John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politics by Other Means: The Original Understandingof
War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 248 (1996) (citing STORY, supra note 18, at § 1185).

See President Abraham Lincoln, Presidential Inauguration Speech, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 4, 1861), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25818
78

(stating he would not ask Congress to declare war against the South).
79
Civil War Facts, AM. BATTLEFIELD TR., http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/faq/
(last viewed Aug. 27, 2018).
80
Id.
81
82

The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
Id. at 668.
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releasing any bombs which may fall in Cambodia."83 In sum, the need for a
declaration can be determined by whether the United States' military posture is
offensive or defensive.
The power to declare war also endows Congress with power to authorize
military force more broadly, even in limited military engagements that do not
rise to warfare.84 Congress has availed itself of this authority in two ways: the
War Powers Resolution and the Authorizations for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF). Both are important safeguards on the Executive, but they have been
rendered toothless in many ways: the Supreme Court and lower courts have
foregone adjudicating potential violations of these provisions by the Executive
due to standing or political concerns85 that would likely have entailed more
detailed explanations of the limits of the Declare War Clause.86
C. The Executive's Commander-in-ChiefPowers
Any argument for Congress's ability to escalate foreign policy responses
will necessarily butt up against the Commander-in-Chief Clause. Understanding
the Clause is therefore vital. This section will first examine the text of the
Commander-in-Chief Clause. Next, this section looks at interpretations of the
Commander-in-Chief Powers over time, from the time of the founding to its
modern-day incarnation.
1. The Text
The Clause reads: "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States[.] '87

83
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1316-20 (1973) (vacating the stay of district court
decision holding that bombing of Cambodia was unconstitutional after Justice Marshall denied the
application to stay).
84
See STORY, supra note 18, at § 1169.
The power, to declare war may be exercised by congress, not only by
authorizing general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to
our situation; or by partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as
they actually apply to our situation, are to be observed.

Id.
See infra Part TV.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 886 (1970) (denying motion for leave to
file a bill of complaint by Massachusetts to declare the United States' participation in the Indochina
War "unconstitutional in that it was not initially authorized or subsequently ratified by
Congressional declaration"); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (denying petition for
certiorari); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968) (denying petition for certiorari); Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (denying petition for certiorari).
87
US CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
85

86
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On its face, the Clause "gives away remarkably little"; it is "a sphinx,
88
and specifying its powers and the theory generating them is its riddle." "These
cryptic words," Justice Jackson famously said, "have given rise to some of the
most persistent controversies in our constitutional history[.] [W]hat authority
goes with the name has plagued Presidential advisers who would not waive or
narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends."'8 9
But some important ideas can be gleaned from a plaintext reading. A
"Commander"--especially one "In-Chief'--denotes one's place in a
hierarchy. 9°
The Clause also assumes the militia's existence and subordinance to the
President.91 Interestingly, though, the President is not alone in calling up the
militia: so, too, can Congress, as necessary. 92
What substantive powers the Clause confers is more opaque. Professor
David Barron (now Judge) and Professor Martin Lederman explain why:
[O]ne might conclude that the use of the root "command," when
combined with the word "chief," suggests that the President's
substantive powers are necessarily preclusive of statutory

88

David Luban, On the Commander-In-ChiefPower, 81 S.CAL. L. REv. 477, 483 (2008).

89
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
90 See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest EbbFraming the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REv. 689, 768-69
(2008) (discussing the use of hierarchical terms in the Clause akin to other constitutional clauses).
Additionally, the notion that the President commands all military forces is not genuinely disputed.
Historical practice alone shows this. So too does the text: though the Marine Corps featured
prominently in the Revolutionary War, it was briefly disbanded shortly after the War's conclusion,
explaining its absence from the Clause. Similarly, flight would not arrive for another century,
explaining the Army Air Corps or Air Force's absence. ALLAN REED MILLETT, SEMPER FIDELIS:
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1-28 (1991).

Who comprises the militia is an important question beyond the scope of this article. See
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) ("[T]he Militia comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense."); id.at 178-79 ("[T]he States were expected
to maintain and train [despite the] sentiment of the time [that] strongly disfavored standing armies;
the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the
Militia--civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.").
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
92
91

Congress shall have the Power. .. To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
Id. This includes both the organized and unorganized militia. See Act of Jan. 21, 1903, Pub. L. No.
57-33, 32 Stat. 775 (also known as The Militia Act of 1903).
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limitation[.] But this reading of the text of Article II would beg
a host of difficult questions. As an initial matter, such an
interpretation offers no convincing account of what it means to
"command." If... bound to act in conformity with statutory
requirements concerning [the President's] use of troops in the
field, it is not clear whether such statutes would infringe his
power to command, or instead simply define that power[.] If the
words of the Commander in Chief Clause were construed to give
the President an illimitable power to establish the modes and
means of waging war, they would render trivial these extensive
Article I powers or, at most, read them merely to give the
legislature the power to adopt advisory regulations93 that the
President would be free to disregard at his discretion.
Given the uncertainty of the scope based solely on the text, our historical
understanding of the Clause aids in shaping these substantive powers.
2.

The Commander-in-Chief Clause as Understood at the Founding

Many have sought to analyze the breadth of power the Commander-inChief Clause conferred on the Executive at the Founding. Unsurprisingly, there
is no consensus: some believe it to be limited, others broad. In this subsection,
each side is explained.
i.

Commander-in-Chiefas a Limited Power

"The term 'Commander in Chief apparently derives from the reign of
King Charles I in the seventeenth century, when it denoted a purely military post
under the command of political superiors." 9 4 Barron and Lederman dutifully
trace the Founders' intent by synthesizing the time's recent history, including the
appointment and powers of the British and Scottish Commanders-in-Chief.95
Arguably as important, they note the "substantive restrictions" Parliament
imposed so as to curtail the King's military operations. 96
Such restrictions are comparable to the laws Congress passed curtailing
then-General Washington's actions, and more broadly the interaction between
Washington and his legislative equals. As leader of the Continental Army,
George Washington "was constantly writing to the Continental Congress seeking

93

Barron & Lederman, supra note 90, at 770-71 (footnote omitted).

94

Id. at 772 (citing 1 CHARLES M. CLODE, THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN: THEIR
ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT 425-29 (London, John Murray 1869) (reproducing the 1638

appointment order of Thomas Earl of Arundel and Surrey as Commander-in-Chief)).
95
Id. at 772-74.
96
Id. at 773 (citing WILLIAM BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY

LAW AND

THE POWER OF THE PURSE 11-17 (1994)).
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permission for all manner of wartime decisions and eagerly awaiting Congress's
approval before implementing his proposals."97 But approval was far from
guaranteed; indeed he was often rejected, setting an important precedent for the
Commander-in-Chief's power. 98 Moreover, Congress even "instruct[ed] the
Commander in Chief and his subordinates[,] deal[ing] with matters from the
deployment of troops to the interception of ships, and much else." 99 Admittedly,
this did not continue throughout the war, as it became impracticable; therefore,
the Congress delegated its power to Washington to conduct operations as he saw
fit. 100
State constitutions also serve as important historical evidence. "Ten of
the new state constitutions designated the state's highest executive officer ... as
the 'commander in chief of the state militia, while two others placed the top
state executive official in control of the military but did not affix that specific
J " 10 ' Upon comparing these constitutions,
title[.]
there was . . . no indication, let alone consensus, that the

executive official named the "Commander in Chief' (or the one
vested with ultimate control over the militia without such a title)
could, by virtue of that office, act in derogation of statutory
restrictions as to military matters. Indeed, not a single one of the
new state constitutions expressly conferred such preclusive
authority, nor did any of them suggest that the legislative branch
would be prevented from interfering with the Commander in
Chief's conduct of military operations. Moreover, five of
them-including the Massachusetts Constitution, which likely

97

Id. at 775.

98

Id.
Id.

774 (citing ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS 20-21, 388 n.76 (1976); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To
CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 108-09 (2d ed.
1989)).
100 Id. at 778 (quoting 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONT[NENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 101
99

at

(Worthington Chauncey Ford et al. eds., 1904-1937)).
And whereas all particulars cannot be foreseen, nor positive instructions for
such emergencies so before hand given but that many things must be left to
your prudent and discreet management, as occurrences may arise upon the
place, or from time to time fall out, you are therefore upon all such accidents
or any occasions that may happen, to use your best circumspection and
(advising with your council of war) to order and dispose of the said Army
under your command as may be most advantageous for the obtaining the end
for which these forces have been raised, making it your special care in
discharge of the great trust committed unto you, that the liberties of America
receive no detriment.
Id.
101

Id. at 781. For a more substantive examination of state constitutions, see id at 780-85.
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was the primary model for the federal Commander in Chief
Clause in 1787-stated expressly that the governor would have
02
to exercise his military powers in conformity with state law. 1
Massachusetts and New Hampshire passed their constitutions closest in
time to the Federal Constitution.'03
After listing this broad set of substantive powers, however, the
Massachusetts [and New Hampshire] Constitution[s] provided
that each of the discrete powers listed, as well as any
unenumerated ones the commander in chief might possess,
would have 'to be exercised agreeably to the rules and
regulations of the
[C]onstitution, and the laws of the land, and
104
not otherwise.'
Taken together, state constitutions support the claim that the Federal
Constitution's Commander-in-Chief Clause does not confer substantive
superiority over the legislature in military efforts.
Another important source of understanding to buttress this is the
Constitutional Convention. "The term 'Commander in Chief first appeared at
the Convention in the plan proposed by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina on
May 29, 1787. It did not appear in the other three early proposed models-the
Virginia and New Jersey plans, and Hamilton's proposal."' 5 Three earlier
constitutional designs would have granted the Executive plenary authority and
would "have the direction of war when authorized or begun,"'0 6 but they were
shot down in part because of this expansive Executive power. 10 7 Ultimately, the
Clause's more muted iteration-with a more limited understanding--"was
passed unchanged and without recorded debate on August 27, 1787. This
expeditious, unremarked assent again suggests a narrow, non-controversial
conception of the clause."' 08
Finally, the state ratification processes are illuminating. State ratification
debates rarely addressed the Clause but, when it was brought up, concerns about
the Clause conferring too much power to the Executive were insufficiently
supported to gain traction and were largely mollified.' 0 9 Arguably the stronger

102

Id. at 782.

103

Id. at 783.
Id. (citing MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. VII).

104

105
106

Id. at 786-87 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 788 (citing 1 Tti RECORDS

OF

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787, at 292 (Max

Farrand ed., 1911) (Alexander Hamilton's proposal)).
107
Id. at 788-89 (discussing the plans put forward and ultimately knocked down).
108
Lofgrent, supra note 59, at 679.
109
Barron & Lederman, supra note 90, at 794-95 (noting specifically the exchange between
Roger Miller and Richard Spaight in North Carolina on July 28, 1788).
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evidence during the ratification period, however, stems from The Federalist
Papers. Alexander Hamilton sought to quell the public's fear of a tyrannical
dictator leading their nation into war-what they had fought against in the
Revolutionary War-in FederalistNo. 69: the Clause "would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first General and admiral of the Confederacy," he wrote." I0 Indeed, Hamilton
went further in a subsequent Federalistessay: "little need be said to explain or
enforce" the Clause."'
ii.

Commander-in-Chiefas a BroadPower

Others have concluded that the Founding generation viewed the clause
"as investing the President with the fullest range of power understood at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution as belonging to the military commander." 112
In first addressing the above contrary arguments, those espousing this
position would distinguish the conclusions drawn from Washington's conduct in
the Revolution. This position has merit, as those requests were made under the
Articles of Confederation, which did not even contemplate an Executive Branch
with inherent-and ever-expanding-powers." 3 There, that evidence and any
derivative conclusions are irrelevant.
But the Articles can also be used to support a wide breadth of executive
powers. In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, "[t]he confederation was,
essentially, a league; and [C]ongress was a corps of ambassadors, to be recalled
at the will of their masters."'' 4 In other words:
The Articles of Confederation were nothing more than a tight
treaty among thirteen otherwise independent states-a selfdescribed "firm league of friendship" in which each state
expressly "retains its sovereignty." Like the later Congress of
Vienna, its "Congress" was merely an international assembly of

110

THE FEDERALIST NO.

III

THE FEDERALIST NO.

112

69 (Alexander Hamilton).

74 (Alexander Hamilton).
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to

the President, Re: Standards
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002).

of Conduct for Interrogation

under 18

U.S.C.

§§

2340-

113 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; Noah Feldman, Trump's War Powers Build on
Obama's, and Bush's, and... , BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGOPINION (Apr. 11, 2017, 10:22 AM),

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-1 1/trump-s-war-powers-build-on-obama-s-

and-bush-s-and ("Whether we like it or not, every president in the modem era has added on to the
presidential power seized by his predecessors."). See generally William P. Marshall, Eleven
Reasons Why PresidentialPower Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505

(2008) (arguing that the power of the Presidency has been expanding since the Founding).
Letter from John Marshall to the Editor of the Alexandria Gazette (July 9, 1819), in
114
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND

JOHN

196,199 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
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ambassadors, sent, recallable, and paid by state governments
with each state casting a single vote as a state."l 5
Given this structure, the Articles can be interpreted to support a wide
executive power. If the Congress was itself the Articles' Executive, Congress's
broad executive powers were effectively gifted to the Executive's next
reincarnation-the Presidency." 6 These include superiority in international
relations and the state's security.
Beyond the Articles, the Constitutional Convention can also be cited as
evidence of wide executive powers under the Clause. The Convention aimed to
imbue the Executive with increasing power in part because Washington was the
presumed inaugural President.' 17 For example, one delegate wrote:
[The President's Powers are] greater than I was disposed to
make them. Nor... do I believe they would have been so great
had not many of the members cast their eyes towards General
Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers
to be given to a President, by their opinions of his Virtue. 8
If the Convention generally sought to endow the Executive with outsized
authority, this would extend to the President's war-making authority under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause.
The text of the Constitution can also be reasonably interpreted to support
a strong executive. As then-Professor Yoo wrote:
If the Framers intended to require congressional consent before
war, they again were perfectly capable of making their wishes
known, as evidenced by the second and third paragraphs of
Section 10, which begin, "No state shall, without the Consent of
Congress." Had the Framers intended to prohibit the President
from initiating wars, or to require him to receive congressional
approval beforehand, they easily could have incorporated a
Section 10 analogue into Article 11. ("The President shall not,

115

Akhil Reed Amar, The Consentof the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment OutsideArticle

V,94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 465 (1994).
116
See Yoo, supranote 77, at 235-41.
See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 222 (1966) (This describes
Washington's history as implicitly nudging delegates "toward unity, strength, and independence
117

in the executive[.]" Therefore, "[wie cannot measure even crudely the influence of the
commanding presence of the most famous and trusted of Americans[.]").
118
Yoo, supra note 77, at 252 (citing Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5,
1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301-02 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911)).
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without the Consent of Congress[.]") But the Framers chose not
to, and instead left the allocation of war powers intact.' 19
Therefore, one can reasonably argue that the Executive's power in international
relations and national security under Commander-in-Chief powers are vast.
3. Subsequent Interpretations and Modem Understanding
Some aspects of the Executive's Commander-in-Chief powers have been
largely undisputed. The best example is the Executive's authority to declare an
' During the War of 1812, James Madison called up
emergency and "repel" it. 20
the militia pursuant to the 1795 Militia Act. The "Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts issued an advisory opinion declaring that the governors or
commanders in chief of the several states had the exclusive right to determine
whether exigent circumstances existed for the militia to be called out."' 2 1 The
opinion meant each governor could veto the President's calling up his or her
state's militia.
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed: "We are all of opinion, that
the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively ' to
22
the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons."'
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court even held that such a decision was
23

beyond judicial review. 1

This fervent debate over the Framers' original intent for the Clause's
scope has been eclipsed by subsequent debates on the topic. What is more,
historical interpretations may be of even greater importance in understanding this
power:
[T]here are few areas of the law where originalism makes less
sense than civilian-military relations. The differences between a
few thousand musketeers and a military of over a million,
garrisoned around the globe and backed by a thermonuclear
force capable of depopulating continents in a matter of days, are
simply too great.' 2 4
In analyzing historical interpretations, the same two factions emerge.

119

Id. at 255 (footnotes omitted).

120

See infra note 174 and accompanying text.

121 John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, Commander of Militia, HERITAGE FoUND.: THE HERITAGE
GUIDE

TO

THE

https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/87/commander-of-militia
Aug. 24, 2018 at 5:32 PM).
122 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827).
123 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 43-45 (1849).
124

CONSTITUTION,

(last visited

Luban, supra note 88, at 508.
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Commander-in-Chiefas a Broad,Substantive Power
Historically

Those who argue the Clause "vests the President with the plenary
authority... to use military force abroad" 125 cabin their argument in the primacy
of security: "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation." 126 For example, in a Memorandum
to the President denoting executive authority to deploy forces abroad, John Yoo
began his analysis with a famous Federalistpassage by saying as much:
[B]ecause "the circumstances which may affect the public safety
are [not] reducible within certain determinate limits,... it must
be admitted, as a necessary consequence that there can be no
limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense
and protection of the community in any matter essential to its
efficiency." 127
Yoo notes other such passages and Supreme Court language echoing these
sentiments. 128
Next, this line of reasoning argues that the Commander-in-Chief Clause
operates not as an island, but in the context of the Constitution's greater text and
structure. Specifically, it reads the Commander-in-Chief Clause in the context of
the Vesting Clause, which provides: "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."12' 9 The Vesting Clause demands
"[t]he President [be] the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations." ' 3 0 And if the "President [is the] sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,""13 such
policy decisions encompass military action as an arm of American foreign

Constitutional Authority, supranote 65, at 188.
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citing Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500,
509 (1964)).
127
Constitutional Authority, supra note 65, at 189 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
128
See id at 189 n.2 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 34 (Alexander Hamilton)); id.(citing THE
FEDERALIST No.41 (James Madison)); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,662 (1981); Miller
v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 305 (1871); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 506 (1870)).
129 U.S. CONST. art. 1I,
§ 1, cl.1 (emphasis added).
130 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing 10 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 613 (1800) (statement of John Marshall)).
131
Id. at 320; see also Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (quoting Haig,453
U.S. at 293-94); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) ("The Founders in their wisdom
made [the President] not only the Commander-in-Chief but also the guiding organ in the conduct
of our foreign affairs [with] vast powers in relation to the outside world.").
125

126
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policy. Thus, when considered in conjunction, this line of argument goes,
"[t]hese powers give the President broad constitutional authority to use military
to threats to the national security and foreign policy of the
force in response
32
United States."'
Arguably the strongest evidence that the Commander-in-Chief Clause
endows the Executive with near-plenary military powers is past practice. If the
President as Commander-in-Chief "has 'the power to dispose of troops and
equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the
country,"' he has certainly exercised that power.133 As of 1966, "[i]n at least 125
'
instances, the President acted without express authorization from Congress."134
By 1990, that number surpassed 200. 35 Moreover, this authority has historically
been stretched significantly. For example, the Korean War "lasted for three years
and caused over 142,000 American casualties" without congressional
approval. 1 1 6 These actions only serve to expand what Justice Frankfurter
famously referred to as a historical "gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. Ii,"' brought on by "'long-continued acquiescence'
from the legislative branch."' 3 8 In recent years, however, the War Powers
Resolution and AUMFs are emblematic of Congress's attempts to counteract the
inertia of acquiescence and recalibrate the separation of war-making powers.
ii.

Clause as Strictly Hierarchical

The latter faction is not without its justifications, too. Having examined
military practices in the nation's first years, Barron and Lederman concluded:
The first seven decades of constitutional practice were not
marked by a surfeit of legislative action specifically restricting
the President's manner of engaging the enemy during battle.
This was not the product of a consensus that the Commander in
Chief must be unfettered in dealing with the enemy. It is better
attributed to two other factors. First, Congress often made the
unsurprising policy judgment that the President should be
afforded broad discretion in deciding how to fight wars. In
132

Constitutional Authority, supra note 65, at 190.

133

Proposed Deployment, supra note 41, at 330 (citing Training of British Flying Students in
the U.S., 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 62 (1941)).
134
Id. at 331 (citing Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, The Legality of United
States Participationin the Defense of Vietnam, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 474, 484-85 (1966)).
135
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).
136
Proposed Deployment, supra note 41, at 331 n.5.
137
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
138
Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer,126 HARv. L. REV. F. 75, 76 (2012) (citing
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613).
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addition, and of more direct relevance for present purposes, the
political branches, as well as courts and scholars throughout the
period, shared the belief that the President was appropriately
bound in his conduct of military operations by a body of widely
accepted international legal norms-namely, the "laws and
usages" of war[, which] were customary, but they were still
understood to constitute a critical component of the legal
structure within which the President exercised his war
powers. 19

Supreme Court precedent can also be read to suggest that the Clause's
power is limited to hierarchical control of the armed forces, not substantive
authority to decide whether to conduct military operations. When adjudicating
the constitutionality of a blockade in the Spanish-American War, the Supreme
Court relied on the fact that:
"[the President's] duty and his power are purely military. As
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements
of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command,
and to employ them in the manner he may deem
most effectual
40
to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy."
Explaining the President's power as limited to military tactics in theater suggests
a narrow reading of the Clause overall.

HI.

THE DELIBERATE SEPARATION OF POWERS

"Even before the birth of this country, separation of powers was known
to be a defense against tyranny."' 14' As Madison said, "[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed[sic], or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."' 42 The Framers therefore
divvied up "powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories,
143
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial."'
The "danger of one branch's aggrandizingits power at the expense of
another branch" cannot be overstated. " In Justice Kennedy's words, "[1]iberty

139
140

141
142

Barron & Lederman, supra note 90, at 952.
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1950).
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996).
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).

143
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (citing
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
144
Id. at 535 (citing Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss1/7

26

Spivak: Co-Parenting War Powers: Congress's Authority to Escalate Conflic
2018]

CO-PARENTING WAR POWERS

one or more of the branches seek to transgress the
is always at stake when
1 45
separation of powers."
The potential perils of separation of powers questions are at their apex
in foreign and military affairs. And the intricacies and nuances may be similarly
thorny. Professor Kate Stith notes that:
in the area of foreign affairs, Congress itself would violate the
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President
to receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties. Although
Congress holds the purse-strings, it may not exercise this power
in a manner 46inconsistent with the direct commands of the
Constitution. 1
In another example, Congress cannot use appropriations to bypass other
constitutional commands such as passing bills of attainder.' 47
However, the commands to which Stith refers (including the pardon
power) are all unitary, affixed to one only in the Executive branch. The "war
powers," as stated earlier, are not-they are divided amongst the Legislature and
the Executive. So, does Congress's foothold on some war powers confer the
legislature authority to escalate a conflict? This subsection reviews the historical
relationship between the two congressional powers above-spending money and
declaring war-and the Executive's Commander-in-Chief powers.
A.

The Separation of Spending and Commander Powers

The power to carry out a war and the power to fund it were deliberately
separated by the Founders-with good reasoning. They divide safeguards against
an unchecked tyrant. Conversely, as Stith explained, spending powers had
reciprocal limits on restricting other branches' endowed powers. First, this
section delves into the Framers' motivations for checking the Executive's warmaking with the power of the purse. Then the section discusses how Congress
has increased its role in the national security regime through its appropriations
decisions.

145 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
("Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion
the Constitution's three-part system is designed to avoid."); Clinton v. City of New York 524 U.S.
417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 Kate Stith, Congress'Powerof the Purse,97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1351 (1988).
147 Id. at 1351 n.33 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1946) ("Congress
cannot enact bills of attainder through appropriations legislation."). Stith also makes an astute
point: direct interference is not the same as refusal to appropriate funds needed for the Executive
to carry out his unitary obligations. Id. at 1351 n.32 (comparing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128, 147-48 (187 1) ("Congress may not interfere with pardon power"), with Hart v. United States,
118 U.S. 62 (1886) ("pardon authority does not alter power of Congress subsequently to refuse
appropriations to pay debts to persons pardoned").
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At the Founding

All students of the past, the Founders were keenly aware of their former
ruler's history.' 4 8 Nowhere was that more evident than with the separation of
powers. Chief among these separations was the need to divide the power to
execute a military effort and to pay for it. "In the eyes of the Constitutional
Convention, the problem was that the national government needed more power
to raise funds and have a national military. For this, it was essential that the public
be reassured that control of the purse strings would vest in the accountable
Congress."' 4 9 And commentary from the Framers confirmed this. At the
Constitutional Convention, George Mason cautioned that the "purse [and] the
sword ought never to get into the same hands [whether Legislative or
Executive.] '"'5 So the Framers devised a "deliberately divided government[,]
making the President the commander in chief and reserving to Congress the
power to finance military expeditions.""15 Jefferson praised this mechanism to
Madison: "we have already given ...one effectual check to the Dog of war by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative
152
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."'
Separating the execution and funding of wars was not the only way in
which the Founders exercised their historical knowledge to keep the Executive's
war-making powers in check with the power of the purse. To fund some of the
monarchy's unending and perilous wars, "[s]ome of the payments came from
foreign governments. Because of these transgressions, England lurched into a
civil war and Charles I lost both his office and his head."' 53 Thus, the Framers
also restricted how the Executive could fund his war efforts by requiring that all
expenditures be taken from the Treasury. 54

148

In his seminal work, David Luban artfully connects the Founding Fathers' understanding of

"Julius Caesar, who crossed the Rubicon with his army and precipitated the civil wars that ended

the Roman republic and made him the first emperor," as well as the English Civil War and Oliver
Cromwell, by examining the writings of the Founding Generation and their references to each of
these historical epochs. Luban, supra note 88, at 508-13.
149 Charles Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391, 406

n.89 (2011).
Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 758,
762 (1989) (citing I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 139-40 (M. Farrand
ed., 1937)).
150

Id. at 762.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); see Fisher, supra note 150, at 762.
153 Fisher, supra note 150, at 761.
151

152

154

OF

An Act of June 30, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-7, 41 Stat. 104, 105 (1919).
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2.

Historical Developments in the Separation of Spending and War
Powers

Noticeably, however, the lion's share of examples of congressional
spending, both generally and within the defense realm, dealt only with
Congress's decision to spend money. But what about the negative use of
appropriations? That is where recent history comes prominently into play.
Throughout history, Congress has restricted federal funding. In fact,
55
Indeed, the
limiting funding provisos first began in defense appropriations.'
issue of negative restrictions on defense appropriations was featured a myriad of
times in the waning years of the 20th century.' 56
In the Vietnam Conflict's waning years, thrice Congress "attach[ed]
amendments to legislation to restrict military actions by the United States in the
Indochina region, as part of a larger effort to compel the withdrawal of U.S.

military forces from the area."' 5 7 One appropriations bill barred financial
assistance to the Cambodian military or deploying troops in Cambodia, 5 8 and
two barred funding "to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over
Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam."' 59 Other legislation
passed at that time used appropriations to restrict troop deployments. 6 0
Arguably the most famous use of Congress's budgetary curtailing was
the Boland Amendment and caps on Nicaraguan intervention. The Amendment
reads:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the
Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to
furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other
support for military activities, to any group or individual, not
The phrase "None of the funds appropriated" was first written to cap civilian defense
employees' salaries. See id. An extended version of that phrase-"None of the funds appropriated
appears in a 1922 provision barring reckless spending in moving war
in this Act ...- first
material. An Act of June 30, 1923, ch. 253, Pub. L. No. 67-259, 42 Stat. 716, 717 (1922).
156 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RS20775, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF
FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS
5-6 (2001), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrsl442/ml/l/highresd/RS20775-20
01Janl0.pdf.
155

157 Id. at 2.

158 Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 5, 84 Stat. 1942, 1943 (1971).
159 An Act of June 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 99, 129 (1973); see also
Continuing Appropriations, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or
heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat
activities by United States military forces in or over or from offthe shores of North Vietnam, South
Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.").
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, §§ 21 27, 88 Stat. 1795, 1801-03
160
(1974).
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part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing
the Govermnent of Nicaragua or provoking
a military exchange
16 1
between Nicaragua and Honduras.
The following year, Congress capped funding for military and
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. 162 In 1984 and 1985, Congress returned to
an out-and-out prohibition on such funds. 163 (The Iran-Contra scandal foiled the

need for further bars, as it was politically untenable to maintain a presence
there. 164)
This tactic was again used in the 1990s. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 794 unanimously approved a peacekeeping operation led by the
United States. 165 In November 1993, Congress set funding for the country's
intervention in the Somali Civil War to expire the following March."1 Two years
later, Congress placed a sunset on Operation Support Hope, the U.S. operation
in the Rwandan Genocide. 167
Congress has also used appropriations to cap troop deployments. The
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 "established a personnel ceiling of 4000
Americans in Vietnam within six months of enactment and 3000 Americans
within one year."' 168 The Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act required the

161
Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830,
1865 (1982).
162
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421,
1452 (1983); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, §§ 108-

109, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983).
163
Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837,
1935 (1984); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-618, §801, 98
Stat. 3298, 3304 (1984); International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-83, § 722, 99 Stat. 190, 249-58 (1985).
164 Notably, the Iran-Contra was a result of the Boland Amendment. The Administration's
National Security Council concluded that the Amendment left legal wiggle room for
communication with the Contras. See Memorandum from J. R. Scharfen to Robert W. Pearson
(Aug. 23, 1985), https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understandingthe Iran ContraAffair/
documents/d-nic-21.pdf. Moreover, the Administration openly flouted appropriations law in
foreign affairs. For example, Colonel Oliver North and Admiral John Poindexter argued that
President Reagan "could authorize and conduct covert operations with nonappropriated funds" and
that he need not disclose such operations because they "were private, third-country funds,"
respectively. Fisher, supra note 150, at 764-65, 764 n.42, 765 n.44.
165
See S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
166

See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8150, 107

Stat. 1418, 1476 (1993).
167
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-335, tit. IX, 108 Stat.
2599, 2659-60 (1994).
168
CongressionalLimitations and Requirementsfor Military Deployments and Funding,CTR.
AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 9, 2007, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/
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Executive to seek specific authorization to deploy substantially more troops than
were already abroad at the time in Lebanon.' 6 9 And in 2000, Congress capped
the number of military personnel in Colombia. 170
These examples demonstrate how Congress has maintained a forceful
role in the national security regime via appropriations decisions. And
appropriations law is not the only area in which Congress maintains a foothold
in the military and war fighting apparatus: only Congress has the right to declare
war.
B.

Congress'sPower to Declare War Versus the President'sCommanderin-ChiefPower

Having only been officially issued five times in our nation's history,171
a declaration of war is among the most important types of legislation that can be
passed. But certainly, declarations of war are themselves different than
executions of war.172 Therefore, it is important to examine the distinction
between declaring war and executing it, dating back to our nation's birth.
1. At the Founding
During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison noted that:
Mr. Mason was [against] giving the power of war to the
Executive, because [he was] not safely to be trusted with it; or
to the Senate, because [it was] not so constructed as to be entitled

2007/01 /09/2449/congressional-limitations-and-requirements-for-military-deployments-andfunding/.
169
Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-43, § 4, 97 Stat. 214, 215
(1983).
170

Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 3204, 114 Stat.

511,575-76 (2000).

See ELSEA & WEED, supra note 76, at 1-5 (The War of 1812, Mexican-American War,
Spanish-American War, and World Wars I and II).
172
One need only look to the 11 declarations of war made in our nation's history (two were
made in World War I and six in World War II). Id. at 1, 4. Of the five Presidents to have signed
those declarations, only three served in uniform prior to being named Commander-in-Chief. See
171

id. at 4; Barri Segal, Donald Trump Isn't the First President Who Didn't Serve in the Military,
CHEATSHEET (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.cheatsheet.com/culture/donald-trump-isnt-the-firstpresident-who-didnt-serve-in-the-military.html/. Moreover, 15 Presidents never held a political
office before assuming ultimate military command. Barri Segal, Donald Trump Isn't the First
24, 2018),
Didn't Serve in the Military, CHEATSHEET (Feb.
President Who
https://www.cheatsheet.com/culture/donald-trump-isnt-the-first-president-who-didnt-serve-inthe-military.html/.
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to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for
facilitating peace. "I
Resultantly, it can be surmised that the Framers endowed the President with the
right to "repel and not to commence war," but to endow the legislature the right
to "declare" it.'" 4 Moreover, the South Carolina Legislature's Ratification
175
Debate confirms this theory.
2.

Interpretations and Actions Taken Post-Founding

According to Harold Koh, historical precedent served as "quasiconstitutional custom" in foreign affairs. 176 It is therefore important to look to
how this thorny separation of powers question has been answered in practice
historically.
Certainly some historical points can be marshalled to demonstrate
Congressional dominance. Consider a 1790 report filed by then-Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson. After pirates captured several American vessels and
took over 100 prisoners,
Jefferson acknowledged that the legislature controlled not only
the general question of whether to offer a military response at
all, but also the nature of any such response: "If war, they will
consider how far our own resources shall be called forth, and
how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms
177
of the constitution, the co-operation of other Powers."

supra note 53, at 548.

173

RECORDS,

174

Id.

175

3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250 (Max Farrand, ed., 1911).

It was at first proposed to vest the sole power of making peace or war in the
Senate; but this was objected to as inimical to the genius of a republic, by
destroying the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve. Some
gentlemen were inclined to give this power to the President; but it was objected
to, as throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity
of involving his country in a war whenever he wished to promote her
destruction.
Id.
176

HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 70 (1990); see also Proposed

Deployment, supra note 41, at 331 ("[T]he relationship of Congress's power to declare war and
the President's authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive has been clarified by 200
years of practice.").
177
Barron & Lederman, supranote 90, at 956 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Report of the Secretary
of State Relative to the MediterraneanTrade (1790), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS 104, 105 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales &

Seaton 1833)).
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The Supreme Court upheld this view in Miller v. UnitedStates.178 There,
the Court ruled on the legality of a court order declaring the forfeiture of personal
property during the Civil War. The Court dove deeper into the Declare War
clause:
The Constitution confers upon Congress expressly power to
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
respecting captures on land and water. Upon the exercise of
these powers no restrictions are imposed. Of course the power
to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by all means
and in any79 manner in which war may be legitimately
prosecuted. 1
The Court later reaffirmed this principle in United States v.
Macintosh.'s There, the Court decided whether a Canadian immigrant should
have his naturalization petition denied because he "was not attached to the
principles of the Constitution," and he "would not promise in advance to bear
arms in defense of the United States unless he believed the war to be morally
justified."' Again, the Court addressed Congress's authority to declare war: "In
express terms Congress is empowered 'to declare war,' which necessarily
connotes the plenary power to wage war with all the force necessary to make it
effective."' 8 2
But as much as some precedent militates towards strict Congressional
assent to military actions, some legal arguments and historical practice militate
against it.
One legal argument was put forward by then-Assistant Attorney General
William Rehnquist. Internally assessing the President's authority to deploy
troops to Vietnam, Rehnquist looked again at the interplay of the Vesting and
Commander-in-Chief Clauses. The Vesting Clause, Rehnquist wrote, demands
"any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature-such
as the power to conduct military hostilities-. . . be resolved in favor of the
Executive Branch." ' 83 In other words, Rehnquist argued that the Framers
intended to fill any space between branches in favor of the Executive. Past
government action may offer the Executive the stronger argument.

78 U.S. 268, 305 (1870) (This is not the name-fellow case regarding the regulation of
shotguns famously discussed in 2nd Amendment cases.).
179
Id. at 305.
180
283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (holding
that an alien who is willing to serve as a non-combatant in the U.S. army but is unwilling to bear
arms due to religious reasons may be admitted citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1940, as
amended by the Act of March 27, 1942).
Id. at 613.
181
Id. at 622.
182
183
Constitutional Authority, supra note 65, at 194.
178
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Historical practice supplies numerous cases in which Presidents,
acting on the claim of inherent power, have introduced armed
forces into situations in which they encountered, or risked
encountering, hostilities, but which were not "wars" in either the
common meaning or the constitutional sense. As the Supreme
Court observed in 1990, "[t]he United States frequently employs
Armed Forces outside this country---over 200 times in our
history-for the protection of American citizens or national
security." In at least 125 instances, the
President acted without
84
express authorization from Congress. 1
The War Powers Resolution ("WPR") has tried to curtail this practice by
mandating Congressional approval for even the deployment of troops into
hostilities that fall short of "war." '85 The WPR's critical reception and success
86
have been lukewarm at best. 1
This was proven true in President Clinton's decision-making process to
send military personnel to Haiti. In 1991, Haitian General Raoul Cddras
18 7
orchestrated a coup d'6tat to overthrow President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
After prolonged (and unavailing) diplomatic efforts,188 Clinton lobbied the U.N.
Security Council ("UNSC") for support. On July 31, 1994, the UNSC passed
Resolution 940 authorizing military intervention in Haiti.' 89 It was "the first
resolution authorizing the use of force to restore democracy for a member
nation."' 9 ° Four Senators wrote to Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger
"request[ing] a copy or summary of any legal opinion that may have been
rendered, orally or in writing, by this Office concerning the lawfulness of the
President's planned deployment of United States military forces into Haiti."' 9'
Dellinger issued a Memorandum with three conclusions: that appropriations
signaled sufficient congressional consent; that the planned deployment would
not violate the War Powers Resolution; and that the operation "was not a 'war'

184

Proposed Deployment, supra note 41, at 331 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).
185
War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012).
186
See, e.g., Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say
Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1998) (The Resolution "was ill conceived and badly compromised
from the start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-contradiction."); Jack Goldsmith, The
Constitutionalityof the Syria Strike Through the Eyes of OLC (and the Obama Administration),
LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 7, 2017, 7:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutionality-syriastrike-through-eyes-olc-and-obama-administration (referring to it as "Swiss cheese").
187
Intervention
in
Haiti,
1994-1995, OFF.
HISTORIAN,
DEP'T
OF
STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti (last visited Aug. 24, 2018, 8:22 PM).
18s Id.
189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 173 (1994).
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in the constitutional sense. Specifically, the planned deployment was to take
place with the full consent of the legitimate government, and did not involve the
risk of major or prolonged hostilities or serious casualties to either the United

States or Haiti." 192
The final conclusion offers an insight into the question we face here:
given potentially low-level military action, whether the Commander-in-Chief
needs Congressional approval may simply depend on "the anticipated nature,
scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited
antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed
resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the
deployment."' 9 3 The more substantial these factors are, the more likely the
Executive needs approval.
But a larger principle may be gleaned about discretion in relation to the
importance of the potential conflict. Relatively low-level conflicts endow the
President discretion: pedestrian, Congressional approval is not sought, let alone
required. The contrapositive means that if Congress's blessing is needed, the
matter is quite serious. Yet it also means that the President has less discretion to
make military and foreign policy decisions against the wishes of Congress.
IV.

CAN CONGRESS Do ANYTHING TO RAMP UP A WAR EFFORT?

Having explored these powers in isolation and in conflict, as well as their
historical deployments, the article turns to the question at hand: can Congress
increase the aggressiveness of a military effort? First, this section reviews the
only other scholarship that endeavored to answer this question and why it did so
in the negative. Then, this section argues the affirmative, while noting practical
considerations that are necessarily implicated.
A. Existing Literature
Only one article has addressed the question of congressional catalyzing
more aggressive military efforts; it argues Congress has no such authority. One
other article tangentially discusses the topic.
In 2010, Charles Tiefer examined this question. Tiefer begins by citing
historical precedent, specifically John Adams being compelled by a more
belligerent Congress to enter the Quasi-War with France in 1798 when Congress
"increased the authorized activity beyond what it had enacted earlier."' 94
Similarly,

193

Id.
Id. at 179.

194

Tiefer, supra note 149, at 410.

192
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Congress pushed President Madison into the War of 1812, and
a similar Congress pushed President McKinley into the SpanishAmerican War. Although Congress had not convened when
President Lincoln dealt with the onset of the Civil War, once it
did convene, it showed great vigor in wanting to fight the war,
including, sometimes, more of a taste for "hawkish" measures
than Lincoln.19 5
These examples are not solely of a bygone era. For example, by relieving
General Douglas MacArthur for his efforts to expand the Korean War,196
President Truman was viewed as more dovish than Congress. 97
'
Tiefer then analyze whether appropriations can press a President into
"stepping up" a war effort.' 9 8 Tiefer offers multiple, varied examples of
appropriations that conflict with the Commander-in-Chief's authority, namely
"command, disposition of forces, and military campaigns."' 99 Tiefer suggests
that such scenarios "shak[e] up habitual ways of thinking" about the
Executive. 200 Resultantly, he concludes that "[t]he constitutional text and
original intent accord[ed] enormous power to Congress through the 'No
Appropriations' clause, but only as used to limit or to constrain military activity.
The clause does not empower Congress to push for more military activity. '"201
Years ago, Gregory Sidak performed an exhaustive examination on what
it means to declare war, albeit in the context of discussing Congress's authority
to regulate and oversee the "prosecution of war," or troops' actions.2 °2
Particularly, Sidak assessed the viability of "us[ing] the appropriations process"
and "the equitable powers of the judiciary to enjoin the President. 2 °3 Despite

195

Id.; see also Sidak, supra note 10, at 85-86.
Yet, history provides a number of commonly ignored examples: John Adams
resisted calls for a declaration of war against France in 1798 and instead sought
authority for the limited and undeclared Quasi-War; James Madison was
ambivalent about declaring war on Britain in 1812; Grover Cleveland in 1896
rebuffed the proposal by various members of Congress to declare war on
Spain; William McKinley in 1898 reluctantly conceded to the same war
fervor; and Woodrow Wilson successfully campaigned for reelection in 1916
on the slogan, "He kept us out of war."

Id.(footnotes omitted).
196
See FAQ: Why Did President Truman Dismiss General MacArthur, HARRY S. TRUMAN
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., https://www.trumanlibrary.org/trivia/macarth.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2018).
197 See Tiefer, supra note 149, at 433-34.
198
See id. at 417.
199
200
201
202
203

Tiefer, supra note 149, at 400 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 417.
See Sidak, supra note 10.
Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
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focusing on ramping down war, he touched on the alternative, noting the
possibility of stepping up military aggressiveness using a declaration of war so
a supermajority in both houses to declare war over
long as Congress "muster[s]
24
the President's dissent." 0
B. Why CongressIs Authorized to Step up Military Efforts
"[I]n the competition for power in foreign relations, Congress has 'an
impressive array of powers expressly enumerated in the Constitution. "'25 With
that in mind, this section puts forward a legal argument as to why Congress can
compel a pacifistic President to increase the intensity of military action.
1. Youngstown's Ebbs
In "the most celebrated opinion in the most famous presidential power
decision in Supreme Court history,"2" 6 Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer °7 reads: "Presidential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those
of Congress. ' 20 8 "He then went on to fashion a sliding scale for the exercise of
executive power vis-dt-vis congressional power, "219 constructing three
"somewhat over-simplified grouping[s] of practical situations."2" 0
First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate." Second, "[w]hen the
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain." In such a circumstance, Presidential authority can
derive support from "congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence." Finally, "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his actions

204

Id. at 85.

206

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 199 (2012) (citations omitted).
Goldsmith, supra note 186.

207

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

208

Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Alex Kozinski, Executive Power in Foreign Affairs, 30 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 137, 137

205

209

(2006).
210

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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"only by2 11 disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject."

This "familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for
evaluating executive action" in separation of powers questions; categorization
lurks ever-present, permeating all such debates, particularly so in national
security and foreign relations questions. 212 And while the framework was
devised to adjudicate a President taking action, it similarly applies to the
President's responses-or lack thereof2' 3-to congressional action. Admittedly,
offering a perspective here is difficult in abstraction,2 14 but a few core concepts
can be fleshed out.
If Congress moves to increase our aggressiveness in foreign policy in
response to what it perceives as insufficient executive action and with an explicit
intent to remedy the inadequacy, the President would almost certainly not be
"act[ing] pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 2 15
foreclosing Category One. The same argument also runs counter to the requisite
"absence of either a congressional grant or .denial of authority ' 216 of Category
Two. That leaves only Category Three.
That the President operates in Category Three is not determinative, but
*it is constitutionally treacherous. When in this category, the President may "rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. ' 217 Thus, if Congress's actions to ramp up war fall
under its powers, the measure will be found valid and the President's contrary
response will be unconstitutional; if the measure is not clearly a congressional
prerogative, the President will have the better argument.
Now, if Congress passed a law that dives deep into military strategy and
operational tactics-for example, where the Seventh Fleet should be-the
President's actions are likely upheld: "As commander-in-chief, he is authorized
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his

211
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524-25 (2008) (citations omitted) (quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635, 637-38).
212
Id. at 524; see, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
669 (1981).
213
Cf Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 612 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing Archie v.
Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)) ("As Judge Easterbrook noted, 'it is
possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect."').
214
As I state later in my conclusion, further analysis of this question is needed with specific
potential legislative solutions in mind for more pointed legal analysis.
215
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
216
Id. at 637.

217

Id.
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command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. 21 8
Short of detailed tactical commands, the answer is far hazier. Brown v.
United States219 is exemplary:
Brown arose from the War of 1812, in which Congress both
declared war and authorized the President in general terms to
use force. The issue was whether Congress had thereby
authorized the President to confiscate enemy property located
within the United States-an action permitted by the laws of
war. The declaration did not authorize the confiscation,
concluded the Court, because it had "only the effect" of creating
a state of war. The Court further held that the authorization to
use force did not support the confiscation, reasoning that the
President could not seize enemy property in the United States
without specific authorization from Congress.22 °
Other constitutional provisions, court precedents, and past practices permit
onlookers to hone in on whether provisions to ratchet up military efforts fall
under the President's or Congress's constitutional powers.
2.

Enumerated Powers Section as Precedent for Congressional
Aggressiveness in International Relations

One argument to support Congress's authority to enact a law stepping
up war efforts stems from its other enumerated powers that, when effectuated,
could cause war. And this is not simply theoretical: Congress has taken action
"to increase its powers" in foreign affairs using this reasoning. 221 This subsection reviews such actions in theory and practice.

218

Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531

(2004) ("Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking
belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making
them."); Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of the courts "to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 587 (acknowledging "broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day
fighting in a theater of war").
12 U.S. 110(1814).
219
220

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on

Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2093 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (citing Brown, 12 U.S. at
122-23, 125-27).
221
Memorandum to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, from Theodore B. Olson,
Legal
of
Office
Gen.,
Att'y
Assistant
https://www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/936126/download.
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EnumeratedPowers Short of Declaring War

The Constitution grants Congress the authority "[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations. '222 Congress exercises that power in multiple ways,
including by passing the Trading with the Enemy Act,223 the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 224 and the Foreign Assistance Act, 225 which
permit the President to enact an embargo at his discretion on a nation if certain
conditions are met.22 6
Congress has also enacted prohibitions against specific nations: the
Cuban Democracy Act; 227 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act; 228 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act; 2 29 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act; 23 ° Iran Freedom Support Act; 23 1 and the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. 23 2 While embargoes and exports
are typically framed as economic and international relations actions, they are at
their root examples of Congress's authority to take aggressive action to escalate
tensions with foreign nations. The upshot of such actions is that Congress can
dictate the conditions under which tensions are escalated, which necessarily
assumes its role in such escalations more broadly.
Powers more directly associated with militaristic action are even clearer

demonstratives. As stated earlier, Justice Jackson once wrote, "out of seventeen
specific paragraphs of congressional power, eight of them are devoted in whole
or in part to specification of powers connected with warfare.,, 23 3 For example,

§ 8, cl. 3.
Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-4341 (2018)).
222

U.S. CONST. art. I,

223

224

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626

(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (2018)).
225

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §

2151 etseq. (2018)).
226
Including a declaration of war, discussed infra Section IV.B.2.iii.
227

Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C.

§ 6001 et seq. (2018)).
228

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,

110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2018)).
229
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701 etseq. (2018)).
230
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114
Stat 1549 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2018)).
231
Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1701, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2018)).
232
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq. (2018)).
233
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950).
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Congress can dictate rules regarding enemy capture 234 and "define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. "235
In one compelling example, Congress can "grant letters of marque and
237
reprisal," 236 which authorize privateers to attack and capture enemy vessels.
These grants are incredibly important to the Framers' grant of power to Congress
in international relations:
Letters of marque and reprisal were one way of referring to what
were known as imperfect wars, special wars, limited wars-all
of which constituted something less than full-scale warfare ....
Blackstone noted that the "prerogative of granting [letters of
marque and reprisal] ... is nearly related to... making war; this

being indeed only an incomplete state of hostilities.

23 8

Because privateers-essentially deputized soldiers remained outside
the executive branch's command and were subject only to rules set by
legislatures' judicial review,2 39 scholars believe this authority "support[s]
2 40
congressional authority over all military actions short of declared war.
Additionally, only Congress can call up the militia. 24' That the Framers
gave Congress rather than the President that power demonstrates their intent to
directly endow Congress a say in our national security apparatus. Moreover,
because doing so could bring about war by escalating our adversaries' military
postures, one can infer that the Framers intended to give Congress the power to
escalate our foreign policy posture. In what political scientists term a "security
dilemma," a state's "attempts to [protect itself] alarms other[s] ... who fear that

U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 11 ("make rules concerning captures on land and water").
Id. § 8, cl.10.
235
236
Id. § 8, cl. 11.
237
John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, Marque and Reprisal, HERITAGE FOUND.: THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONST., http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/50/marque-and234

reprisal (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).

Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMi L. REV. 61, 68 (1995)
238
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
239
See C. Kevin Marshall, PuttingPrivateers in Their Place: The Applicability of the Marque
and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.953, 959-63 (1997).
240
Id. at 953.
241
The President may only do so under statutory authority. See, e.g., The Militia Act of 1795,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2018));
The Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2018));
The Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current version at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331 335 (2018)); Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3-4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15
(expired in part 1873 and current version at 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2018)); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 152 n.9 (2004) (citing Calling Forth
Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795)).
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undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability
will be increased.- 242 As enemy nations incorrectly view defensive actions as
offensive, they respond in kind, creating a self-perpetuating cycle. Calling a
militia up creates such a dilemma: if Congress calls up a militia, other nations
could respond in kind, heightening tensions and leading ineluctably from war
games to war. That Congress can take such an action is an important data point
to infer the Framers' intent to imbue Congress with the ability to take escalating
actions in international relations.
ii.

Congress and State Militias

Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides: "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress, .

.

. keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of

Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with.., a foreign Power, or engage
in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.,

243

In lay terms, Congress is the states' constitutional gatekeeper to
maintaining armies, including personnel and materiel. These forces-the
National

Guardspersons

by

1903 24-would

be under their Governor's

control. 245 Thus, others-governors-must too be authorized to "make" war,
further diminishing the President's claim of sole ownership of military troop
direction, let alone foreign affairs broadly.
The upshot of these enumerated powers is that the Constitution
anticipates that Congress can authorize aggressive actions, including war-like
actions, without presidential consultation or assent. Moreover, the Framers
explicitly ensured that Congress could play a substantive role in the foreign
policy apparatus, including our troops' posture. Thus, any actions Congress
undertakes to catalyze more aggressive foreign policy would fit squarely within
the Framers' original design of Congress's powers, affirming their
constitutionality.

242

Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167, 169 (1978).

243

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).

See Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, Pub. L. No. 57-33, 32 Stat. 775 ("[T]he militia shall
consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become
a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age ....
").
245
See, e.g., MAss. CONST. art. VII ("The governor shall be commander-in-chief of the military
and naval forces of the state."); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
244
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iii.

Congress'sPower to Declare War

As detailed earlier, the President can repel attacks without Congressional
approval,24 6 but "[n]othing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of
'
a war is entrusted only to Congress. ' 247 Even if declarations are "obsolete," 248

Congress's authority to issue them has not diminished. And that power is
extraordinarily important to Congress's ability to step up a military effort.
Declaring war is not an isolated act; it is the first domino. The
repercussions of such an act are vast.2 49 Consider some of the federal statutes
automatically triggered upon a war's declaration: the President's War Powers
251
Act 250 reporting requirements change; the Trading with the Enemy Act
restricts economic action; the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 25 2 extends

statutes of limitations for certain crimes; the Alien Enemy

Act 253

permits large-

25 4

warrant requirements
scale deportations; myriad criminal statutes are opened;
255
and
change under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for electronic
257
256
military
surveillance; military offenses and jurisdiction changes;
physical
personnel can change command structures; 25 8 adjustments are made to income
taxes; 25 9 substantial budgetary adjustments are made, including restricting
reconciliation bills, 260 capping new discretionary spending, 26 and suspending
some sequestration requirements. 262 Among the stranger triggers, assassinating

246

See supra Section III.B. 1.

247

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952)

(Jackson, J.,

concurring).
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
248
249

The extent to which a declaration of war creates international effects is unfortunately beyond

the scope of this article.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2018).
250
251

Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411 (codified at 50 U.S.C.

§§ 4301-4341 (2018)).
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2018).
252
253

Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (2018).

254

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§443,757,792-94,1038,1091, 1653,2153-54,2381-82,2384,2388

89, 2441 (2018).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1844 (2018).
255
256

50 U.S.C. § 1829 (2018).

257

ELSEA & WEED, supra note 76, at 38-40.

258

14 U.S.C. § 3(b) (2018) (making the Coast Guard potentially subject to the Navy's control).

259

ELSEA & WEED, supra note 76, at 41.

260

2 U.S.C. § 641(d) (2018).

261

Id. § 642(a).

262

Id. § 907a(b-c).
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a foreign agent may be permissible. 263 The President also has newfound
discretionary authority under hundreds of additional statutes.2 64
By readying the country for war, these Congressional actions already
step up a military effort. While the President may veto such actions, this will not
matter if the law is constitutional and Congress overrides it. Therefore, it must
be the case that Congress has the authority to step up military efforts unilaterally.
3.

The Take Care Clause as Enabling Congressional Powers

"Article H vests '[t]he executive Power... in a President of the United
States of America,' who must 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 2 65 Writing of this to Alexander Hamilton, George Washington
stated: "It is my duty to see the Laws executed-to permit them to be trampled
upon with impunity would be repugnant to [that duty]. 266 However, this
"elephant[] in [a] mousehole"26' 7 could permit Congress to force the President
to
intensify a military effort.
"Only a few Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Take Care
Clause. ' 26 8 Nevertheless, relevant jurisprudence yields important lessons. Most
importantly, the Clause mandates the Executive execute what Congress decides:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to
see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.269
In this way, the Clause is solely a conduit, enabling the Executive to
carry out the laws Congress passes under its enumerated powers.2 7 ° Said another

263

ELSEA & WEED, supra note 76, at 35.

264

See id. at 23-75.

265

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010)

(alteration in original) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3).

266

Letter

from

George

Washington

to

Alexander

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-12-02-0257

Hamilton

(Sept.

7,

1792),

(last visited Aug. 26, 2018).

267
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REv.
1835, 1836 (2016) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)); see id.
at 1836 n.9 (citing Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 64-68 (1994)).
268
Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration's UnprecedentedLawlessness, 38 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 63, 70 (2015).
269
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).

270

See generally Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 267 (linking the Take Care Clause to
different enumerated powers).
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the necessary laws is in Congress; the
way by the Court: "The power to make
'2 7 1
power to execute [is] in the President.
This understanding extends to international relations. In the PacificusHelvidius debates, Madison wrote:
A treaty is ...to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried
into execution, like all other laws, by the executive magistrate[.]
The power to declare war is subject to similar reasoning. A
declaration that there shall be war, is not an execution of laws:
it does not suppose preexisting laws to be executed: it is not in
any respect, an act merely executive. It is, on the contrary, one
of the most deliberative acts that can be performed; and when
performed, has the effect of repealing all the laws operating in
a state of peace, so far as they are inconsistent with a state of
war: and of enacting as a rule for the executive, a new code
adapted to the relation between the society and its foreign
enemy. In like manner a conclusion of peace annuls all the laws
peculiar to a state of war, and revives the general laws incident
to a state of peace.2 72
Madison could not have been clearer: the President is a quarterback
running Congress's play call. Moreover, Madison assumes the Clause applies to
the international realm; logically, Congress must be authorized to legislate in that
realm. Therefore, if the Commander-in-Chief and Vesting Clauses are properly
viewed as vehicles through which the Executive executes Congress's legislative
prerogatives in the foreign relations or military realms, one can infer Congress's
constitutional authority to widen military efforts.
4.

The Necessary and Proper Clause's Role in Resolving Separationof-Powers Issues

A second argument can be made based on the Necessary and Proper
Clause. A functionalist interpretation of the Clause accepts the Constitution's
imperfection:
One scanning the Constitution for a sense of the overall structure
of the federal government is immediately struck by its silences.
Save for some aspects of the legislative process, it says little
about how those it names as necessary elements of

271
272

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008) (citations omitted).
James Madison, Helvidius Number I (1793), in ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON,

THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793-1794, at 55, 59 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
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government-Congress, President, and Supreme Court-will
perform their functions .... ,273

In the face of such constitutional chasms, something must fill the void.
Functionalists argue that that right belongs to Congress, which is endowed "not
only its own powers, but also 'all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
274
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.',
Thus, "the text on its own terms contemplates that Congress will determine how
[the government's] powers are best exercised., 275 In other words, the Clause
grants Congress "the job of creating and altering the shape of the federal
government .
"...,,276And, importantly, this view is not strictly academic; the
Supreme Court, in addition to other courts, has adopted pragmatism as a North
Star for constitutional questions.2 77
Notwithstanding arguments that Congress is impliedly authorized to
catalyze foreign policy actions, critics could at best argue that "[t]he Constitution
does not directly authorize" Congress from taking such action.27' But nor does it
prohibit Congress from doing so. Such a scenario is exactly when functionalism
can reign. And adopting this interpretive lens, the Constitution's silence on the
precise delineations and machinations of warmaking authority would authorize
Congress, not the President, to fill the void. Thus, a more hawkish Congress has
the authority to force a more dovish President's hand to let slip the dogs of war.
This interpretive view is not unlimited: functionalists do not adopt the
position that the Clause's role as a backstop or catchall2 79 grants Congress
unlimited authority. Rather, as the Court itself cautioned upon adopting a
functionalist view, pragmatism cannot come at the cost of "creat[ing] a
substantial threat to the separation of powers."28 In the words of "Justice White's
canonical functionalist dissent[] 2 81 in INS v. Chadha,2 82 the relevant question is
whether the act in question "is consistent with the purposes of Art. I and the

273

Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the

Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 597 (1984).
274
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REv.

1939, 1951 (2011) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
275
Id. (citing Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1800
(1996)).
276
Strauss, supra note 273, at 598.
277
See Manning, supra note 274, at 1952-58 (compiling cases).
278
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
279
Which is also subtly reinforced by its position as the final enumerated power, where catchall
clauses typically reside.
280
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986).
281
Manning, supra note 274, at 1953.
282

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Powers which are reflected in that Article and
principles of Separation of 283
throughout the Constitution.Again, Congress's catalyzing foreign policy developments creates no
such threat and remains consistent with the purposes of Article I. As shown
below, the Framers specifically contemplated and foresaw Congress's role in
foreign affairs. Effectuating that role does not jeopardize the separation of
powers; it bolsters the Framers' vision for co-equal branches of government.
5.

Past Practices: AUMFs and Seeking Congressional Approval

"In separation-of-powers cases this Court has often 'put significant
weight upon historical practice."' 2 84 Two significant historical sources bolster
the constitutional theory that Congress can increase foreign or military
aggressiveness: Presidents seeking authorizations of the use of military force and
the authorizations themselves.
Often in our nation's early days the President explicitly requested
Congressional assent to hostilities below that of declared war. In 1805, Spanish
forces used their territory in what is now Florida as a staging ground for
incursions into America's newly acquired Louisiana Purchase.2 85 Pressured to
act, Thomas Jefferson asked Congress for authority to attack:
Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested
with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I
have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force[.]
The course to be pursued will require the command of means
286
which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny.
But Congress denied Jefferson's request, and he did not pursue the
matter further.287
This position was reaffirmed several years later. "Napoleon Bonaparte
seized power in 1799 after overthrowing the French revolutionary government.
During this time, U.S. and French negotiators were concluding negotiations to
end the Quasi-War with France. ' 288 Hemorrhaging money to pay for the war
effort, the French sought international credit in the fledgling United States.

283

Id. at 977 (White, J., dissenting).

284

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (citation omitted).

285

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 23 (1973).

Id.
1897)).
286

(quoting 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 377 78 (J.D. Richardson ed.,

287

Id.

288

Napoleonic Wars and the United States, 1803 1815, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, DEP'T OF

STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/napoleonic-wars
2018).
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When France persisted in her refusal to pay long-standing
claims for damage to American shipping during the Napoleonic
wars, [Andrew] Jackson, instead of moving on his own, took
care to ask Congress for a law "authorizing reprisals upon
French property, in case provision shall not be made for the
payment of the debt[.]" Jackson was not seeking a blank check
but rather authorization to act in case of a formal refusal on the
part of the French government.289
Again, Congress refused such authority.
True, these instances occurred in an "era in which the presidential war
power was 'still in its infancy,' and when Congress micromanaged wars." 2 This
though should not blunt the practice's precedential importance.29 1
The other important source of history is authorizations for the use of
military force, or AUMFs. Today, AUMFs are the focus of much legal
scholarship in international affairs and national security, but AUMFs date back
to the Quasi-War with France in the late 1790s.2 9 2 Even back then, Congress, not
the President, dictated the terms of military engagement, marking their territory
in warmaking power. For example, two such legislative actions "did not
authorize [the President] to use all of the armed forces of the United States or to
conduct military incursions beyond specified military targets, and they limited
'
the geographical scope of the authorized conflict to the high seas." 293
As the
Supreme Court wrote:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time.
If a general war is declared, its extent and operations are only
restricted and regulated by thejus belli, forming a part of the law
of nations; but if a partial war is waged, its extent and operation
depend on our municipal laws.2 94

289

SCHLESINGER, supra

note 285,

at

28-29

(quoting

3

MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE

1325 (J.D. Richardson, ed., 1897)) (emphasis added).
290
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 2093 (citing Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 104 (2d ed. 1996)).
291
Especially so when, as Professor Lawrence Tribe prophetically noted, "we are all
originalists now." Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
PRESIDENTS

INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 67 (1997).

292
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 220, at 2072-73 (citing Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48,
1 Stat. 561; Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, 1 Stat. 574 (supplementing Act of May 28, 1798)).
293

Id. at 2073.

294

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800) ("[The authorizations permitted] a limited, partial, war.
Congress has not declared war in general terms; but congress has authorized hostilities on the high
seas by certain persons in certain cases.").
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Indeed, "[m]ost authorizations to use force in U.S. history have been of
this limited or partial nature. "295 Their exhaustive analysis also notes "even when
Congress has declared war, it has always taken the additional step of authorizing
the President to use force to prosecute the war."296
[The] survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress
has authorized the President to use force in many different
situations, with varying resources, an array of goals, and a
number of different restrictions. All of the authorizations restrict
targets, either expressly (as in the Quasi-War statutes'
restrictions relating to the seizure of certain naval vessels),
implicitly (based on the identified enemy and stated purposes of
the authorization), or both.297
But Goldsmith and Bradley are careful to highlight the "four crucial
differences" between authorizations granted during a declared war and those
issued during sub-war hostilities: during a declared war, the authorization does
"methods of force,"
not limit the President's resources or "military forces,"
"authorized targets," or purpose, namely to win the war.29 8
Congress's role in sub-war hostilities has been both prominent and
precise. Congress has often "restrict[ed] the resources and methods of force that
the President can employ, sometimes expressly restrict[ed] targets, identif[ied]
relatively narrow purposes for the use of force, and sometimes impos[ed] time
limits or procedural restrictions" for sub-war conflicts.2 99
This historical precedent demonstrates that Congress has the power to
escalate sub-war hostilities. Therefore, under Jackson's Youngstown framework,
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress"-namely escalating tensions-the President's actions would
not pass constitutional muster because he would not be "rely[ing] only upon"
powers exclusively endowed to his office.3"0
6.

Discretionary and Constitutional Exceptions to the Take Care
Clause

If Congress passes a law to catalyze military efforts, the President is
constitutionally obligated to enforce it. "To contend that the obligation imposed
295

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 220, at 2073. For a more complete analysis on

authorizations of force in the United States history, see id. at 2072-78.
296
297
298
299
300

Id. at 2062.
Id. at 2077.
Id. at 2074-75 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2078.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
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on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid
their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely
inadmissible."3 °1 Usually. There remain two overarching theories as to how the
President may not faithfully and fully enforce or execute the law: prosecutorial
discretion and constitutional concerns. Each is explained in turn.
i.

Discretion

While obligated to enforce the law, the President has some implicit
degree of discretion in how to do so. The Executive's discretion is widely
accepted-though not blindly so-particularly in criminal prosecution and
agency determinations.
The decision to charge a criminal is itself discretionary. "[S]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."' 3' 2
Analogous discretion has also been read into agency decision making by
the judiciary, as "an agency decision not to enforce [a statute] often involves a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.""3 3 Because "[t]he agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal
with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities," the
agency should determine what violations to pursue.3" In Goldsmith's and
Manning's view, this holding stands for the proposition "that the discretion
implicit in decisions not to enforce a statute lay beyond the power of courts to
review."30 5 Indeed, some simply deemed the holding sufficient to prove that the
Executive is afforded discretion in enforcing laws more broadly. 306
Analogous concerns mirror those of the judiciary when overseeing our
military leaders' execution of a military effort. Courts have made this point,
albeit when dealing with Congressional intent to temper war efforts. In Crockett

301

Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838).

302

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-

Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,489 90 (1999) (finding prosecutorial discretion appropriate

in deportation proceeding because courts cannot judge authenticity or adequacy of executive
branch's reasons for deportation); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding
prosecutorial discretion appropriate because prosecutor, not courts, evaluate strength of case,
allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60708 (1985) (discussing factors prosecutors may consider in prosecutorial decisions).
303 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 267, at 1847 (quoting Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821,
831 (1985)).
304
Id.
305

Id.

306

See Daniel Stepanicich, Comment, PresidentialInaction and the ConstitutionalBasisfor

Executive Nonenforcement Discretion,18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1510 (2016).
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v. Reagan,3" 7 29 Congresspersons sued the President, seeking: "declaratory

judgments that [President Reagan] violated the [War Powers Resolution], and a
writ of mandamus and/or an injunction directing that [he] immediately withdraw
all United States Armed Forces, weapons, and military equipment and aid from
El Salvador and prohibiting any further aid of any nature. '"308
The Court dismissed the case for a notable reason: "The Court lacks the
resources and expertise (which are accessible to the Congress) to resolve
disputed questions of fact concerning the military situation in El Salvador ....
of factfmding in this situation should be left to the political
The subtleties
309
branches."
A president could take advantage of this. For example, facing a law
aimed at ratcheting up military efforts, a President could nominally enforce it; he
could cite his discretion in bad faith and as pretext for his objection thereof. If
this happens, as explained in the next sub-section, Congress likely has the
authority to sue him in order to compel his compliance.
ii.

Executive ConstitutionalityAnalysis

In addition to only halfheartedly applying the law per his "discretion,?'
the President could interpret a law to be unconstitutional and subsequently not
enforce it.
The Supreme Court has cautioned against the Executive Branch's
unilateral decision to ignore the law: "the Constitution ... is silent on the subject
of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly
enacted statutes. There are powerful [arguments] for construing constitutional
silence ...

as [a] prohibition." 3" 0 Yet some scholars hold that if the President

believes a law to be unconstitutional, he can choose to not enforce it. 311
This view rests on the assumption that "the President's paramount
obligation in ensuring the faithful execution of the laws is to uphold the

558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 896; see also Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
308
(1948) ("The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs,
has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published to the
world.").
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982).
309
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,439 (1998).
310
Another dimension beyond this article's scope complicates things: the executive's choice
311
not to defend a statute in court. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 753 (2013)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 530D and noting the Obama Administration's refusal to defend the Defense of
Marriage Act despite enforcing its provisions). For an exhaustive review of this idea, see
307

Carlos A. Ball, When May a PresidentRefuse to Defend a Statute? The Obama Administration
and DOMA, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77 (2011).
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Constitution as the supreme law of the land."'3 12 "If the President is to take an
oath to uphold the Constitution, enforcing laws that are themselves
3 13
unconstitutional could not fulfill that duty.
Professor Dawn E. Johnsen outlined the non-enforcement argument: the
President should respect a "presumption of constitutionality,... [which] should
be overcome only when non-enforcement would allow the President responsibly
and usefully to advance constitutional norms and dialogue regarding their
definition. ' 314 Johnsen then posits two overarching principles for nonenforcement: scarcity and deference. First, if the President overuses nonenforcement, it infringes too much on requisite bicameralism and presentment,
if not the legislative process more broadly.315 Second, because "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is" 3 16-meaning
the judiciary is owed deference in adjudicating
constitutional questions-the President's analysis should only be "afford[ed]
greater weight to the President's views when the President possesses special
institutional expertise of relevance."3 7 This certainly extends to foreign
relations. Therefore, if the President feels Congress enacted a bill be that reaches
too far in ratcheting up America's military posture, he could argue he is permitted
to not enforce it. How can Congress respond? That's easy: sue him.
C. Suing a Non-Compliant President
Accepting that Congress is legally permitted to ratchet up the war effort,
one question looms: enforcing Congress's actions. Can Congress force an
uncooperative President to comply?3 1 8 Issues of the standing and the political
question doctrines arise.
312

Dawn E. Johnsen,

Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable

Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10 (2000).
313

Cruz, supra note 268, at 74 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 723 (3d ed. 2000)).
314

Johnsen, supra note 312, at 12.

315

Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983).
[T]he Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the
Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions .... The

President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of twothirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final
arbitrary action of one person.
Id.
316

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

317
318

Johnsen, supra note 312, at 13.
Infamously, if apocryphally, Andrew Jackson once said: "John Marshall has made his
decision; now let him enforce it." Worchester v. Georgia, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/govemment-politics/worcester-v-georgia- 1832 (last
visited Aug. 26, 2018).
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1. Questions of Standing
"In limiting the judicial power to 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' Article HI
of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts,
which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons
'
Justice Scalia penned "the
caused by private or official violation of law."319
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing":
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical[.] Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury
has to be fairly ...

trace[able] to the challenged action of the

defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.32 °
These requirements ensure that "the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
" ' Otherwise the judiciary would be "'roving commissions assigned to
behalf."32
pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws."' 3 2 On the other hand, too
narrow a reading of standing ensures that "some questions of law will never be
presented to this Court, because there will never be anyone with standing to bring
a lawsuit."3'23

Assume Congress enacts a statute over the President's veto, who then
does not "take care that [it] be faithfully executed."3'24 The majority of
Congresspersons would understandably want to sue to enjoin the President's
inaction. Should they do so, the case would "implicate[] the constitutionality of

319
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (citing U.S. CONST. art. Ill).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations and quotations
320
omitted).
321
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 581 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
322
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973)).
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
323
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)).
U.S. CONST. art. III.
324
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another Branch's actions and thus merits an 'especially rigorous' standing
analysis. 32 5
In Raines v. Byrd,3 26 the Supreme Court held that six members of
Congress3 27 did not have standing to sue over the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act.3 28 But the Court has never considered a case in which the
plaintiffs constitute a majority of Congresspersons. Because the suit would likely
be filed in District of Columbia federal courts, such precedent is both applicable
and demonstrative that the Congressperson-plaintiffs would likely have standing.
Many cases filed in the D.C. District and circuit courts with analogous plaintiffs
have been upheld, a number of which have explicitly stated that germane
precedent "does not stand for the proposition that Congress can never assert its
institutional interests in court. Instead, it expressly leaves that possibility
329
open[.]",

The Supreme Court's most recent standing case, Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,330 is also

instructive. The Court found the Arizona state legislature had standing to
challenge Arizona's independent redistricting committee. 33 1 Importantly, the
D.C. District Court observed, the Arizona Court:
carefully distinguished Raines, emphasizing its narrow holding
"that six individual Members of Congress lacked standing to
challenge the Line Item Veto Act." The Arizona Court reiterated
that there was "some importance to the fact that
[the Raines plaintiffs] not been authorized to represent their
respective Houses of Congress." In contrast, the Arizona
Legislature was "an institutional plaintiff asserting an
332
institutional injury.

U.S. House of Rep. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12 (2015)).
326
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
327
Four Senators and two Congressmen. Id.at 814 n. 1.
325

328

Id. at 829-30.

Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2013); see
also United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Comm. on
Judiciary, U.S. House of Rep. v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 68 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Raines and
subsequent cases have not undercut either the precedential value ofAT&T] or the force of its
reasoning."); U.S. House of Rep. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 1998)
("The finding of an injury in this matter neither conflicts with Raines v. Byrd nor gives rise to a
doctrine of legislative standing.").
330
135 S.Ct. 2652 (2015).
329

Id. at 2666.
U.S. House of Rep. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted) (citing Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S.Ct. at 2664).
331

332
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The D.C. District Court thought this persuasive, finding that the House

of Representatives-which voted to sue two Cabinet Secretaries for improper
enforcement of the ACA-had standing.333 Therefore, there is reason to believe
that should the President insufficiently enforce a law, Congress may have
standing to sue. Thus, fears of an uncooperative President should not deter

Congress from exercising its constitutional authority to ratchet up a war effort.334
2.

Prudential Standing Considerations

Satisfying the jurisdictional standing requirements may not be enough.
"[T]here may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning
the adjudication of' such a case.335 There exists no specific, enumerated factors
336
that comprise these concerns, but in an act "of judicial self-governance,"
courts can decide not to hear a case if relevant "prudential factors that counsel
against hearing [a] case. . . 'outweigh the concerns underlying the usual
reluctance to exert judicial power.'"'"
One concern is the precedent the case would set. As Justice Kennedy
wrote in United States v. Windsor, "[t]he integrity of the political process would

Id. For background on the case, see, for example, Michael A. Memoli, GOP-Led House
Votes to Sue Obama in First-of-Its-Kind Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2014),
2
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-house-votes-to-sue-obama- 0140730-story.html.
334 True, by this logic, the converse could apply, and the President could sue Congress to enjoin
a law's enforcement. "As [the Court] indicated in Raines v. Byrd, if Congress can sue the Executive
for the erroneous application of the law that 'injures' its power to legislate, surely the Executive
can sue Congress for its erroneous adoption of an unconstitutional law that 'injures' the
Executive's power to administer" the law. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 790 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997)). Scholars have adopted
this position. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield:
The Commander in Chiefs Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REv. 79, 118 (1995) (citing Panel
Discussion, The Appropriations Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
623, 646 (1990) (remarks of Kate Stith, law professor, Yale University)). So, too, have Supreme
Court Justices, see Goldwater v. Carter,444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.") (emphases added)),
and other federal appeals judges, see Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Certainly, were Congress to pass a resolution to the effect
that a report was required under the WPR, or to the effect that the forces should be withdrawn, and
the President disregarded it, a constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be
presented."). That said, this view is not without its detractors, however. Cf Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) ("Perhaps an individual President
might find advantages in tying his own hands. But the separation of powers does not depend on
the views of individual Presidents, nor on whether 'the encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment."') (citations omitted)).
335 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 760 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983)).
336
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
333

337

Windsor, 570 U.S. at 745 (citing Worth, 422 U.S. at 500-01).
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be at risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a

routine exercise."33' 8 Yet just after offering that cautionary warning, Kennedy
stated that courts ought not prioritize precedent-militating against
adjudication-when the cause of action is "not routine," 339 as was the case in
Windsor. So, too, would be litigation between a majority of Congresspersons and
the President concerning Congressional action to increase military
aggressiveness, favoring adjudication.
Moreover, if recent holdings are indicative, prudential standing concerns
may be losing influence. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia
highlighted a change in the prudential standing doctrine:
While we have at times grounded our reluctance to entertain
such suits in the "counsels of prudence" (albeit counsels
"close[ly] relat[ed] to the policies reflected in" Article 11), we
have since held that such suits do not present constitutional
"cases" or "controversies." They are barred for constitutional
reasons, not "prudential" ones.34 °
Therefore, it is likely that the non-routine case of political branches suing one
another over the constitutionality of Congressional action to ramp-up foreign
intervention surpasses any everlasting albeit decreasing prudential concerns.
3.

Sufficiently Political to Forego the Thicket?

Assuming Congress aims to enforce a catalyzing law, it need also be
wary of the political question doctrine, which "excludes from judicial review
those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress
34 1
or the confines of the Executive Branch.
What constitutes a nonjusticiable political question comes from the
Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr.3 4 2 Couching the question "as
essentially a function of the separation of powers[,]" Justice Brennan articulated
a six-factor test:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination

338

Id. at 763.

339

Id. at 745.

340

Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014)

(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
341

342

Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
pronouncements by various
embarrassment from multifarious
3 43
departments on one question.

all." 3

Importantly, a court "need only conclude that one factor is present, not

Many cases relating to the military and foreign affairs are dismissed
under the political question doctrine because relevant precedent provides cover.
Arguably the safest refuge can be found in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.
v. Waterman Steamship Corp.3 45 In that case, the Court gave the President
constitutional leeway in international affairs, including deferring to related
agency decisions,3 46 because such military and foreign policy judgments
are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which have long been held to
of political power not subject to judicial
belong in the domain
3 47
intrusion or inquiry.

Said differently, a court's "duty to defer to the Executive's military and
foreign policy judgment is at its zenith ' 3 48 because "[t]he Constitution primarily
delegates the foreign affairs powers 'to the political departments of the
government, Executive and Legislative,' not to the Judiciary. 3 49 There is also a
pragmatic dimension: "By their very nature, military decisions must be made and
35
revised in battle on a real-time basis; judicial decisions rarely are or can be."
Thus, many courts deem "[d]isputes involving foreign relations . . . [the]

'quintessential sources of political questions,"'

351 requiring

343

Id. at 217.

344

346

Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
Id. at 110-14.

347

Id. at 111.

345

dismissal under the

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 682 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
349 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 213 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
348

(quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 111).
Sidak, supra note 10, at 115.
350
351 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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doctrine. This may embolden Congress to pass such a law, betting courts dismiss
claims over the law's constitutionality.
But just because a cause of action implicates military matters does not
foreclose its adjudication by the judiciary. "' [I]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' That duty will sometimes
involve the '[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of
one of the three branches,' but courts cannot avoid
their responsibility merely
352
'because the issues have political implications."
Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Zivotovsky v. Clinton, "[t]he
courts are fully capable of determining whether this statute may be given effect,
or instead must be struck down in light of authority conferred on the Executive
by the Constitution. 3 53
Zivotosky provides a good comparative. President Bush argued that a
statute allowing Jerusalem-born U.S. citizens to record "Israel" as their place of
birth on their passports-allegedly undermining then-Executive policy not to
recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital--"impermissibly interfere[d] with the
President's constitutional authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs and to
supervise the unitary executive branch., 354 After both the D.C. district and circuit
court found the question nonjusticiable,3 55 the majority of the high court
disagreed, holding that "the only real question for the courts is whether the statute
35 6
is constitutional[,]" which courts must adjudicate.
Such would be the case here, too: courts would be called upon not to
determine whether the country should step up military action, but "whether the
statute impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the
Constitution. 3 5' Therefore, though the political question doctrine may appear a
convenient shield, courts cannot reasonably avail themselves of such a duck-andcover.
V.

CONCLUSION

A day will come when a hawkish Congress will consider how to spur a
dovish Commander-in-Chief to action. As demonstrated above, the two most
likely congressional strategies to do so are by using appropriations and AUMFs,
if not outright declarations of war. These prerogatives are mighty levers, as the

Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) and INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)).
353
Id. at 191.
352

354

Id.at 192 (quoting Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal

Year 2003, 2 PUB.PAPERS 1698 (Sept. 30, 2002)).
355 Id. at 193-94.
356
Id. at 196.
357

Id.
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Framers intended; this article offered arguments as to why Congress is authorized
to pull on them.
Having looked to Congress's enumerated powers, one can infer
Congress's ability to increase international action. Moreover, the Necessary and
Proper Clause-not the Vesting Clause-acts as the constitutional backstop
clause, suggesting all mixed powers rest ultimately with Congress. Still more,
the Take Care Clause also offers support to Congress's claim to authority in the
arena of foreign affairs. Finally, historical precedent for requests and grants of
AUMFs buttress these theories. The devil will be in the details, but these broad
strokes demonstrate why Congress has a legitimate claim to step up military
action as a tool in foreign affairs.
The question explored in this essay, however, speaks to a greater clash
of ideas: should Congresspersons, the most accountable agents-at least by
election standards--drive the broader agenda, or should the President be
afforded "a degree of discretion and freedom"'3 58 from the legislature for
pragmatic reasons? As is often the case in separation of powers questions, the
answer lies not in analogical reason, but in each person's fundamental
assumptions and understanding of our democratic system.

358

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

59

